Our Supreme Court’s double jeopardy analysis in Powell applies where the question is whether the State has alleged or shown discrete, prosecutable acts under identical statutory language, and our Supreme Court’s analysis in Wadle applies where the question is whether the State has alleged or used the same evidence to show violations of different statutory language. However, in certain circumstances, both Wadle and Powell may apply.
Criminal
Peters v. Quakenbush, No. 25S-PL-152, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 19, 2025).
If a person “is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction,” that person must “register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f). This applies to a person residing, working, or attending school in Indiana even though that person committed no offense in the other jurisdiction that imposed the triggering registration requirement.
Heitz v. State, No. 24A-CR-802, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 6, 2025).
When a trial court’s local practice conflicts with Criminal Rule 4(C), the local practice is invalid, and delays arising from noncompliance with such practices cannot be charged to defendants.
Maze v. State, No. 24A-CR-2596, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., May 28, 2025).
When determining whether to appoint counsel, trial courts must consider three distinct items—assets, income, and necessary expenses in calculating a defendant’s ability to pay. If the parties fail to provide the information, courts themselves must make inquiries calculated to bring out the necessary evidence.
Qualls v. State, No. 24A-CR-131, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., May 15, 2025).
Unless there is new evidence or information discovered to warrant additional charges, the potential for prosecutorial vindictiveness is too great for courts to allow the State to bring additional charges against a defendant who successfully moves for a mistrial, thus creating the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.