The grand jury statutory framework does not mandate that the State submit a matter for deliberation as to whether to issue an indictment. The State need not identify or name the target of the grand jury proceeding and identify the crime that the target was alleged to have committed unless the grand jury proceeds to deliberate on whether to issue an indictment.
Criminal
Seabolt, Dillard, Tyson, and Robinson v. State, No. 24S-PC-270, 24S-PC-271, 24S-PC-272, 24S-PC-273, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Aug. 20, 2024).
Once a judge concludes their recusal is mandatory, they must continue recusing in future cases when confronted with the same concern that led them to recuse in the prior case. That is, unless their prior recusal was mistaken or circumstances have changed so that their recusal is no longer mandatory, in which case they again have a duty to preside.
Schoeff v. State, No. 23A-CR-02163, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 26, 2024).
While the Richardson actual-evidence test no longer applies to claims of substantive double jeopardy violations, it does apply to claims of procedural double jeopardy.
Frye v. State, No. 23A-CR-1691, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 31, 2024).
The ability to consent is a unifying theme to the separate situations of proscribed conduct constituting Level 3 felony rape; a defendant should be able to ask the alleged victim questions about their shared sexual history to determine whether there is any basis by which defendant could defend themselves by arguing the alleged were consensual.
Henderson v. State, No. 24A-CR-667, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 26, 2024).
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(c)(1) proscribes the application of alternative misdemeanor sentencing (AMS) to a second felony within three years when “the person has committed a prior unrelated felony for which judgment was entered as a conviction of a Class A misdemeanor.” The statute employs past tense, as opposed to prospective, terminology; anticipated AMS for a prior unrelated felony would not bar AMS in a current case.