Unless there is new evidence or information discovered to warrant additional charges, the potential for prosecutorial vindictiveness is too great for courts to allow the State to bring additional charges against a defendant who successfully moves for a mistrial, thus creating the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Appeals
Lammons v. EDCO Environmental Serv., Inc., No. 24A-CT-2057, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., May 2, 2025).
When defendant asked the city to protect consumers from “unscrupulous licensed contractors,” her statement, as a matter of law, did not constitute a false defamatory statement. Defendant neither stated nor implied a provably false fact but merely indicated her honestly held opinion.
Waldon v. State, No. 24A-CR-1824, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Apr. 16, 2025).
To determine whether offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct, courts must balance the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the time span over which the offenses occurred and the time between the offenses, with extra weight given when the offenses are simultaneous or contemporaneous; (2) whether the offenses occurred at separate locations, and if so, the distance between them; (3) whether the offenses each stand alone, that is to say, can be described without reference to one another; and (4) whether the offenses are united by a common scheme or purpose beyond the mere desire to commit multiple crimes. No one factor is determinative, although the first two are the most important. Ultimately, the time, place, and circumstances must demonstrate that the offenses are but parts of a larger or more comprehensive series such that they can be fairly described as a single episode of criminal conduct.
Stafford v. Stafford, No. 24A-DC-2457, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Apr. 21, 2025).
Eliminating all overnights amounts to a restriction on parenting time.
Schaefer v. State, No. 24A-CR-1387, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Apr. 11, 2025).
A trial court possesses the authority to instruct the jury on the penal consequences of a not responsible by reason of insanity verdict, and a guilty but mentally ill verdict, on its own accord to instruct on what it perceives to be a confused jury.