Statute requires only one operating stoplight on a vehicle, so motorist whose vehicle had one operating stoplight and one burned out was not in violation of the traffic law, and officer’s good faith belief that an unoperational stoplight was an infraction did not justify stopping the motorist, so that motion to suppress should have been granted.
State v. Joslyn, No. 49S04-1102-CR-85, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 16, 2011)
When protective order notice was left at subject’s home but the return of service did not indicate that notice was also mailed to last address as required by Trial Rule 4.1, subject’s statement to police and admission at trial that he received the notice in combination with evidence of T.R. 4.1 notice attempt were sufficient to support his invasion of privacy conviction.
State v. Tharp, No. 49S02-1005-CR-256, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 16, 2011)
Actual notice of a protective order sufficient for a conviction of invasion of privacy need not come from an agent of the state, but in this case conviction is reversed because the only evidence defendant knew of the protective order was testimony the protected person told him about it and at the same time said the order was no longer valid.
In Re Guardianship of J.Y., No. 27A02-1005-GU-744, ___ N.E.2d ___, (Ind. Ct. App., Feb 15, 2011)
“[R]equirements of a personal representative are not the same as the requirements for a guardian, and as a result a nonprofit corporation not authorized as a corporate fiduciary in Indiana may serve as guardian where it could not serve as a personal representative.”
Thompson v. Gerowitz, No. 49A05-1005-CT-296, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 16, 2011)
Juror’s silence during voir dire when taken with her subsequent statement to the trial court regarding possible bias required the trial court to conduct a hearing out of the presence of the remainder of the jury to determine whether the juror’s silence indicated bias or lack of disinterest, and whether the hearing itself created a bias in the juror.