Trial court was within its discretion to find that defendant was not “diligent” in pursuing belated appeal under P-C.R. 2, which is exclusive means to reinstate untimely appeal in criminal cases; relief under In re Adoption of O.R. (Ind. 2014) is limited to civil cases.
Criminal
Willie Moore v. State, No. 49A02-1505-CR-321, ___ N.E.3d ___, (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).
Illinois residential burglary statute was “substantially similar” to Indiana burglary offense; despite not expressly containing a “breaking” element, Illinois caselaw infers such a requirement, and Illinois statute classifies it as a “forcible felony.”
Evidence was insufficient to support “bodily injury” element of resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony; fact that officer was injured while chasing defendant on foot established only contributing, not proximate, causation.
Kimberly Y. Morgan v. State, No. 34A05-1509-CR-1323, ___ N.E.3d ___, (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).
Amount of restitution awarded to embezzlement victim was abuse of discretion; award included sums an audit revealed were missing but were not shown to be connected to defendant’s conduct, and expenditures to determine the amount of loss.
Slaybaugh v. State, No. 79S02-1601-CR-28, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., Jan. 20, 2016).
Fact that juror was Facebook “friends” with relatives of the victim did not establish juror misconduct, when juror testified that she did not know them personally or recognize them in court, and trial court found her testimony truthful.
Coleman v. State, No. 47A01-1506-IF-659, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2016).
Speed-limit sign facing southbound traffic, reducing speed limit from 55 to 35 mph, was ineffective against northbound motorist, despite county ordinance setting 35 mph speed limit unless otherwise designated; by state law, default speed limit for the road was 55 mph unless “appropriate signs giving notice of the altered limit are erected on the street or highway.”