In addressing a Batson challenge by a defendant who failed to rebut the State’s purported race-neutral explanation at trial, the fundamental error standard is used on appeal to evaluate the argument the explanation was a pretext; concludes State’s explanation was a pretext when “the State failed to strike apparently similarly situated non-black venirepersons, . . . mischaracterized Turner’s voir dire testimony when offering its race-neutral reason for striking him from the panel and failed to engage Turner in any meaningful voir dire examination on the issue of his reliance on expert witness testimony.”
Supreme
Hampton v. State, No. 84S04-1103-PC-161, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 14, 2012).
When the evidence of the actus reus of the crime is entirely circumstantial, an instruction is required that “[i]n determining whether the guilt of the accused is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should require that the proof be so conclusive and sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.” Pattern Instruction on the topic inappropriately has the jury rather than the judge determine whether evidence is all circumstantial, and mens rea evidence should not be subject to the special instruction. In this case, DNA evidence would appropriately have been considered as circumstantial.
Sanjari v. State, No. 20S03-1105-CR-268, __M N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 16, 2012).
“Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-5 permits a separate class D felony conviction for nonsupport of each dependent child, but only one such offense may be enhanced to a class C felony where the unpaid support for one or more of such children is $15,000 or more.”
Adams v. State, No. 29S02-1109-CR-542, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 2, 2012).
To impose the IC 35-48-4-15(a) mandatory license suspension for using a vehicle in the commission of a drug offense, the “State must demonstrate that a defendant made more than an incidental use of a motor vehicle in committing his offense”; evidence defendant “possessed a jar of marijuana by keeping the jar on the floorboard in front of him while he sat in the passenger seat” supported suspension; it was “not a situation in which a defendant merely happened to possess a small bag of marijuana in his pocket without making any direct use of the vehicle to do so.”
Person v. Shipley, No. 20S03-1110-CT-609, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind., Jan. 31, 2012).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony offered by a personal injury defendant in a rear-end collision case.