DAVID, J.
We have granted transfer in this case to address whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based on a concerned citizen’s tip of a possibly intoxicated driver. At 1 a.m. on April 23, 2009, a 911 call was made by a motorist [Davies] who identified himself and provided his phone number. The caller complained that he had been following a driver of a blue Volkswagen who had been driving erratically and was going to “kill somebody.” The caller told the 911 operator the vehicle just pulled into a BP Gas Station. Within 90 seconds, an officer arrived at the BP Gas Station and observed the blue Volkswagen. With this corroboration, the officer made an investigatory stop of Amanda Renzulli. The trial court granted Renzulli’s motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. We hold that the police officer in this instance did have reasonable suspicion and reverse the trial court.
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In Indiana, the Court of Appeals has held that an anonymous tip, or a tip from an unidentified informant, “can supply information that gives police reasonable suspicion.” Bogetti v. State, 723 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Furthermore, “[a] tip will be deemed reliable when an individual provides specific information to police officers such as a vehicle description.” Id. In Bogetti, several police officers were dining at a McDonald’s restaurant. Id. at 877. During the meal, a man approached one of the officers and informed him that another individual, Bogetti, had just exited the restaurant, drove away in a white semi, and “may be intoxicated.” Id. at 877–78. Immediately thereafter, the officers left the restaurant and began to follow the white semi. Id. at 878. The officers stopped Bogetti and smelled alcohol on his breath. Id. After conducting field sobriety tests, Bogetti was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated. Id. The Court of Appeals held that “facts possessed by the Officers gave rise to the reasonable suspicion that the truck was being operated by an impaired driver and were sufficient to sustain the legality of the investigatory stop.” Id. at 879.
Although we do not believe this case involves an anonymous tip, we still reach the same conclusion through the Bogetti analysis—the tip was enough to permit a brief Terry stop. Davies provided independent indicia of reliability. He provided the color and make of the vehicle, at the location the police arrived, at a time of night with minimal vehicular traffic, and importantly, the police officer arrived almost immediately after the 911 dispatch. Because we believe Davies’s tip provided enough independent reliability, we need not rely on Renzulli’s future behavior.
Similar to the officers in Bogetti failing to stop and question the unidentified informant, the officers in the present case did not speak with Davies. However, the circumstances of this case warranted an immediate response by the police for the safety of the general public, as well as for the safety of Renzulli herself. There are legitimate State concerns in deterring driving while intoxicated. Bogetti, 723 N.E.2d at 878 (citing State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 1986)).
[T]he average number of deaths per year for the last ten (10) years attributable to drunk drivers in the United States is 25,000. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the current state of affairs has resulted in such terrible carnage wreaked upon society by drunk drivers that the slaughter exceeds that of all our wars.
Garcia, 500 N.E.2d at 161 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983)). The U.S. Supreme Court revisited the dangers of drunk driving in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). It pointed out that over 25,000 deaths, one million injuries, and $5 billion worth of property damage is caused by drunk driving every year. Id. at 451.
The Stop of Renzulli [Footnote omitted.]
In the present case, the police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Renzulli’s vehicle. We first reiterate that we agree with the State and the Court of Appeals that the caller should be considered an identified informant or concerned citizen, not an anonymous tip. The caller identified himself as Andrew Davies and gave his telephone number to the 911 dispatch officer. He next described the vehicle as a blue Volkswagen Jetta or a Volkswagen Passat. Davies described where the vehicle was located, “just pulling into a BP Gas Station.” Davies stated he was unable to obtain the license plate of the vehicle because he “stayed away from it” due to its erratic driving. And he also described the criminal activity observed, “he is all over the road he is going to kill somebody,” and “[h]e run over the cement uh, center of . . .”
In looking at the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Renzulli for investigatory purposes. The facts known to Sergeant Schnarr were that a blue Volkswagen of a suspected drunk driver had just pulled into the BP Gas Station before Sergeant Schnarr arrived at 1:00 a.m. Based on the time of the evening, location, and specific vehicle color and make, and the almost immediate response by Sergeant Schnarr, we conclude that reasonable suspicion did exist to detain Renzulli for investigatory purposes. As previously discussed, an investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion, a considerably lesser standard than probable cause. Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). It was Officer Schnarr’s conversation with Renzulli and his observations of her that gave him probable cause to then arrest Renzulli.
Shepard, C.J. and Sullivan, J., concur.
Dickson, J., concurs in result without opinion.
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion:
. . . [T]here was minimal to no “corroborative police investigation” in this case. The sole officer testifying at the suppression hearing noted that he did not witness the vehicle make any maneuvers, other than when it began backing out of the gas station parking space just prior to being ordered to stop. The officer testified that he did not know whether other blue cars or Volkswagens were located in the parking lot of the gas station at the time Renzulli was stopped. And the officer never corroborated whether Renzulli’s car was the same car referred to by the 911 caller. Further the 911 caller identified the errant driver as “he” and obviously Renzulli is a woman.
Our standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency issues. State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006). The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court’s decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. Further, when appealing the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress, the State appeals from a negative judgment and must show that the ruling was contrary to law. State v. Augustine, 851 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. Id. I agree with the majority that “[t]his is a close case.” Slip op. at 10. And because this is so, I side with the trial court. Cf. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 343 (affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress drugs discovered in defendant’s truck following a routine traffic stop).