“Given the uniqueness that pervades different family units, strict standards on the amount of permissible visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Act would be difficult to craft. As such, trial courts should be able to consider the various circumstances presented in each individual case to determine what is in the child’s best interest.”
L. Rush
Satterfield v. State, No. 63S00-1401-LW-306, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. June 26, 2015).
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting officer’s lay-witness testimony that an allegedly mentally ill defendant was “evasive” during police questioning.
In re I.B., No. 82S05-1502-AD-63, __N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 11, 2015).
“Under the circumstances of this case, Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1(c) regrettably bars an adoption that, to all appearances, would otherwise be in I.B. and W.B.’s best interests. But that does not make the statute unconstitutional as applied, because its prohibitions are rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose and do not discriminate against a suspect class. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment on both adoption petitions and remand…”
Young v. State, No. 49S02-1505-CR-275, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., May 14, 2015).
“[U]nder the unusual operative and procedural facts of this case—the actual shooter remaining unidentified, the resulting ambiguity as to whether these Defendants intended to carry out a shooting, the State’s choice to rely on the shooting alone in the charging instruments and at trial, and the trial court’s unambiguous finding of reasonable doubt on that particular theory—we hold Defendants lacked fair notice of the [murder by beating] charge of which they were ultimately convicted, which under these circumstances establishes fundamental error.”
In re M.K., No. 49S02-1505-JC-260, __N.E.3d __ (Ind., May 12, 2015).
“Because the trial court’s remarks and conduct, in their cumulative effect, breached the court’s duty of impartiality and amounted to coercion of Father, we reverse the CHINS adjudication.”