If a person “is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction,” that person must “register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f). This applies to a person residing, working, or attending school in Indiana even though that person committed no offense in the other jurisdiction that imposed the triggering registration requirement.
G. Slaughter
Diamond Quality, Inc. v. Dana Light Axle Products, LLC, No. 24S-CQ-265, __N.E.3d __ (Ind., Apr. 24, 2025).
Absent a contractual or statutory duty, a property owner is always justified in excluding another from the owner’s premises.
JWB v. State, No. 24S-CR-288, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Feb. 24, 2025).
Even if the recent amendments to Ind. Code 31-30-1-4(d) and 31-37-1-2 (the juvenile jurisdiction statutes), are remedial, the General Assembly did not intend to apply them retroactively to pending cases.
Tingley v. First Financial Bank, No. 24S-PL-299, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Feb. 25, 2025).
Venue statutes do not remove or alter a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, which is separate and distinct from a trial court’s consideration of prudential matters.
Willow Haven on 106th Street, LLC v. Nagireddy, No. 24S-PL-287, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Feb. 19, 2025).
Trial court’s injunction was improper because the plaintiff did not prove they are likely to win their public-nuisance claim alleging defendant’s proposed land use violates the city’s unified development ordinance.