Slaughter, J.
An Indiana trust beneficiary sued the trustee, an Indiana bank, in an Indiana trial court over whether and how to dispose of trust property. Because the trust holds Illinois real estate, is governed by Illinois law, and includes mostly Illinois beneficiaries, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court erred in doing so. Although these facts may raise questions about the most appropriate forum for resolving these Illinois-centered issues, this issue is not before us. We answer only the jurisdictional question presented and hold that the trial court has power to adjudicate this matter.
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In 2023, Tingley sued the trustee in Vigo County, Indiana, where it is headquartered. She asked the trial court to direct the trustee to “carry out the terms of the Trust”, referencing the twenty-year sale provision, and sought a court order requiring the trustee to sell all trust property. In response, the trustee sought to dismiss the case arguing that “Indiana has no subject matter jurisdiction over this cause as the Trust at issue is administered in Illinois.” It also argued that “no county in Indiana has venue” under the Indiana Trust Code. At the same time, the trustee filed its own suit in Illinois about the conflicting trust provisions and sought a declaration that, among other things, it be allowed to extend the trust’s duration, as John directed. After briefing by the parties, the Indiana court granted the trustee’s motion and dismissed the action below for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Tingley appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Tingley v. First Fin. Bank, 232 N.E.3d 1171, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The appellate panel ruled that the trial court has jurisdiction over the Indiana suit although the trust and its assets are in Illinois. Id. at 1177–78. In doing so, the court distinguished conflicting appellate precedent, In re Alford Trust, 897 N.E.2d 946, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, which held trial courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over trust disputes when “Indiana has no relation to the administration of the trust”. Id. at 951. The panel below also found that Indiana’s trust-venue statute, Ind. Code § 30-4-6-3(b), does not limit jurisdiction over multistate trusts. Tingley, 232 N.E.3d at 1178. A “multistate” trust, as the name implies, has “significant contacts or relationships with more than one state.” Bogert’s The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 291 (July 2024 Update).
The trustee then sought transfer, which we granted, 241 N.E.3d 1131 (Ind. 2024), to resolve the conflict within the court of appeals over whether an Indiana trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute involving a multistate trust. Our grant of transfer vacated the appellate opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
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Subject-matter jurisdiction turns on one question: does a court have the constitutional or statutory power to hear the case. Payne-Elliott v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 193 N.E.3d 1009, 1013 (Ind. 2022). The trustee contends that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking here because the disputed trust is based exclusively in Illinois. We disagree. Our legislature has endowed Indiana courts with subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil trust suits. Yet with multistate trusts, some courts have found that jurisdiction turns on non-jurisdictional factors like choice-of-law questions, venue rules, and the specifics of a particular trust. See, e.g., Alford Trust, 897 N.E.2d at 951. Again, we disagree.
We proceed in two parts. First, we outline the framework for determining subject-matter jurisdiction over multistate trusts and find jurisdiction present here. Second, we conclude that the trustee’s contrary arguments fail because they are unrelated to jurisdiction. In doing so, we explain that the trustee’s reliance on Alford Trust is misplaced, and that the trustee’s arguments turn on two non-jurisdictional doctrines, comity and forum non conveniens.
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Superior courts, like the court below, have broad power—“original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases”. I.C. § 33-29-1-1.5(1). One such civil case is a declaratory-judgment action. Id. § 34-14-1-1. The legislature has empowered “[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions” with “power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Ibid. The Vigo Superior Court, where Tingley brought this action, is a court of record. Id. § 33-33-84-3.
Given these statutes, the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Tingley’s action against the trustee. She seeks a declaration that the trustee may not renew the trust and an injunction compelling it to sell trust property consistent with the trust agreement. Tingley’s civil action seeks a declaration of her rights under the trust agreement and thus falls squarely within the broad civil jurisdiction of superior courts generally, id. § 33-29- 1-1.5(1), and the Vigo Superior Court specifically, id. § 33-33-84-3.
Despite these statutes, the trustee relies on the trust code’s venue provision to claim that the trial court lacks jurisdiction because venue supposedly exists nowhere in Indiana. The trustee misreads the trust code and misunderstands venue….
Consistent with this trust-code provision, our trial rules likewise say that venue statutes do not remove or alter a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction….
We hold that the trial court below, as a court of general jurisdiction, has subject-matter jurisdiction over cases like this one, which seeks to force a trustee to adhere to the trust’s terms.
Having established the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, we next explain the distinction between jurisdiction—the power to adjudicate a dispute—and prudential matters for which a trial court with jurisdiction may nevertheless dismiss a case. In doing so, we overrule Alford Trust, which conflates jurisdiction with unrelated prudential concerns like where trust property is located, where the trust is administered, where venue lies, and what law applies. 897 N.E.2d at 951. Second, we explain that trial courts may decline to hear a case (though jurisdiction is secure) under doctrines of comity or forum non conveniens. These doctrines are not before us, though, because the trustee has yet to raise them.
We have long sought to stamp out the “casual use of the notion of jurisdiction”. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ind. 2006). Indeed, “[a]ttorneys and judges alike” frequently confuse jurisdiction with other concerns. Ibid. Such confusion occurred here. The trustee cast the prudential issues inherent in overseeing multistate trusts, choice-of-law questions, and venue concerns as problems of jurisdiction. For instance, the trustee claimed that the “legal effects” of this case “are properly heard and decided by the appropriate court in Illinois that has primary subject matter jurisdiction” over the trust because the trust is administered in Illinois. This claim confuses choice-of-law issues with jurisdiction.
That said, the distinction between choice of law and jurisdiction can be blurred when a trust spans several states.. Thus, when litigation involves a multistate trust, courts should keep first things first: ensure subject-matter jurisdiction before turning to prudential issues.
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Though the Vigo Superior Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the disputed trust here, prudential concerns may still subject this case to dismissal in the court’s discretion. Doctrines of comity and forum non conveniens, for instance, permit a trial court with jurisdiction nonetheless to decline to exercise its power.
Comity is the principle that a court has discretion to dismiss a case “as a matter of courtesy and convenience when there are pending proceedings in an out-of-state court”…
Our trial rules also permit discretionary dismissals under the doctrine of forum non conveniens if a court determines another jurisdiction would better handle the case. T.R. 4.4(C). Even if jurisdiction is secure, a court still “may dismiss ‘under such reasonable conditions as the court in its discretion may determine to be just.’” DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Brown, 29 N.E.3d 729, 732–33 (Ind. 2015) (quoting T.R. 4.4(C)) (emphasis in original).
For now, though, neither doctrine is before us because the trustee’s dismissal motion implicated only subject-matter jurisdiction, which lies here. On remand, if the trustee persists in its view that this case does not belong in Indiana, it can seek dismissal under one or more discretionary doctrines like comity or forum non conveniens. Neither doctrine affects the court’s jurisdiction. And neither doctrine compels dismissal of a case over which the court has jurisdiction.
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For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s jurisdictional dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Rush, CJ., and Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur