In the entrapment context, apparent agency does not depend on the principal’s express or implied authorization for the agent to act on the principal’s behalf; rather, apparent agency exists when a principal’s manifestations induce a third party to reasonably believe there is a principal-agent relationship.
E. Tavitas
Crabtree v. State, No. 21A-CR-2752, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Dec. 1, 2022).
Terry-level reasonable suspicion is not an absolute necessity for a dog sniff of a hotel-room door. The degree of suspicion is just one factor to be considered under the general Litchfield balancing test.
A.R. v. State, No. 22A-JV-156, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Oct. 5, 2022).
While Ind. Code § 31-30-2-3, states that the trial court, on its own motion, may reinstate a jurisdiction over a juvenile after release from DOC, a motion by the prosecution is sufficient. Moreover, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-4.5, which subjects an offender who is at least 14 years age to sex offender registration, applies at the time of registration, not when the delinquent act was committed.
Hayko v. State, No. 21A-CR-2407, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Sep. 28, 2022).
Ind. Rule of Evid. 608 sets forth two types of evidence; opinion and reputation. In contrast to reputation evidence, opinion testimony is admissible if rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or to a determination of a fact in issue.
Holmgren v. State, No. 21A-CR-2756, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Sept. 30, 2022).
To receive an increased sentence under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(c) for Level 1 felony child molesting, Apprendi mandates that a victim’s age is a fact that must be determined by the fact-finder.