A Frampton claim, an exception to Indiana’s employment-at-will doctrine. requires the claimant to prove that her employer actually or constructively discharged her solely to deter her from seeking workers’ compensation benefits.
C. Goff
Abbas v. Neter-Nu, No. 24S-CT-435, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 24, 2025).
The trial court erred by inviting the jury to find the hospital liable independent of its vicarious liability for the actions of the nurse and doctor, but joint-and-several liability precluded the need for reversal of the jury verdict.
Peters v. Quakenbush, No. 25S-PL-152, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 19, 2025).
If a person “is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction,” that person must “register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f). This applies to a person residing, working, or attending school in Indiana even though that person committed no offense in the other jurisdiction that imposed the triggering registration requirement.
Thomas v. Foyst, No.25S-MI-148, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 19, 2025).
The only statutory authority for a court to set aside election results is through an election contest. A declaratory judgment action filed before the election did not preserve the candidacy challenge.
Thomas v. Valpo Motors, Inc., No. 24S-PL-286, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., May 13, 2025).
For purposes of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, in claims alleging breach of implied warranty, a buyer need only show to the satisfaction of the factfinder that the seller had “a reasonable opportunity to cure” its failure to comply with its warranty obligations. The buyer can meet this burden of proof by showing that he explicitly asked the seller to cure (i.e., repair, replace, or refund) or that he notified the seller of the purported defect and the seller proposed no remedy in response.