The Protection Order Act does not permit the reissuance, renewal, or extension of the protective order when there has been a single episode of physical violence with no follow-up act, no threat that the violence will recur, and no other reasonable grounds to believe there is present intent to harm.
C. Goff
A.M. v. State, No. 19S-JV-603, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Nov. 12, 2019).
A court should evaluate a juvenile’s claim of ineffective counsel in a delinquency disposition-modification hearing by using a due process standard; it should consider counsel’s overall performance to determine if the child received a fundamentally fair hearing resulting in a disposition that served his best interests.
Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd., No. 19S-PL-37, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Nov. 12, 2019).
“Under the equitable estoppel doctrine, a party’s conduct—even relating to the repair of goods—may toll a contractually agreed-upon limitations period when that conduct is of a sufficient affirmative character to prevent inquiry, elude investigation, or mislead the other party into inaction.”
C.S. v. State, No. 19S-JV-137, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Oct. 1, 2019).
Ind. Admin. Rule 14(B) permits remote participation in juvenile disposition-modification hearings where the parties have agreed or where the court issues a good cause order based on the factors listed in the rule including the child’s best interest.
Easler v. State, No. 19S-CR-324, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Sept. 20, 2019).
When a party requests a hearing on possible juror bias or misconduct, after voir dire and selection but before the jury is sworn, a trial court should hold such a hearing if the party demonstrates some relevant basis for that bias or misconduct.