Rejects argument that caselaw has superseded Lawrence v. State’s holding permitting ” some accrediting of the child witness in the form of opinions from parents, teachers, and others having adequate experience with the child, that the child is not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters.”
Miller v. State, No. 08S02-1102-CR-108, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 24, 2011)
Adopts Court of Appeals holding that IC 35-50-2-2(i)’s provision limiting suspension of Class A felony child molesting sentence, with a perpetrator over 21 and a victim under 12, to portion of sentence over 30 years does not establish the minimum sentence for the offense, which is 20 years.
Cotton v. Cotton, No. 43A03-1005-DR-325 , ___ N.E.2d___, (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 24, 2011)
Summons served on wife was insufficient as a matter of law for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant, because it neither complied with Trial Rule 4(C)(5) or due process. Due process requires that, at a minimum, a respondent in a dissolution proceeding be notified of the risk of default for failure to appear or otherwise respond.
Sanjari v. State, No. 20A03-1007-CR-384, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 11, 2010)
Defendant was properly tried in absentia after he refused to leave his cell for trial, when evidence indicated he had been ill due to his hunger strike but was better on the date of trial. Defendant was also properly denied additional continuances near trial and properly required to represent himself, after the court had granted one continuance for defendant’s counsel of choice to obtain admission in Indiana pro hac vice but counsel then submitted two defective requests for admission. Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal nonsupport, one for each of his children, but as there was only a single support order for support in gross, he could be convicted only a a single count of failure to support.
Goens v. State, No. 41A01-1006-CR-277, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 14, 2011)
Statute requires only one operating stoplight on a vehicle, so motorist whose vehicle had one operating stoplight and one burned out was not in violation of the traffic law, and officer’s good faith belief that an unoperational stoplight was an infraction did not justify stopping the motorist, so that motion to suppress should have been granted.