LWOP sentencing order was deficient for failure to include judge’s personal statement that LWOP was the appropriate sentence.
Kemper v. State, No. 15A01-1408-CR-340, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. June 17, 2015).
State presented insufficient evidence that defendant conspired to commit robbery; alleged co-conspirator’s guilty plea to conspiracy could not be considered as substantive evidence against defendant, and remaining evidence was insufficient to show agreement to rob.
Ammons v. State, No. 45A03-1411-CR-394, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. June 17, 2015).
Sex Offender Registration Act was not unconstitutional ex post facto punishment as applied, even though defendant’s offenses were in 1988 and SORA was not enacted until 1994; the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, including seventh “excessiveness” element that is “accorded special weight,” balanced in favor of finding registration non-punitive.
Ohio v. Clark, No. 13-1352, ___ U.S. ___ (June 18, 2015).
Three-year-old’s report of abuse to his preschool teachers was not testimonial hearsay, and therefore did not violate Confrontation Clause when admitted at trial. Neither the child—nor the teachers, despite their mandatory reporting obligations—had the “primary purpose” to create substitute for trial testimony or assist in prosecuting defendant, but rather to respond to ongoing child-abuse emergency by identifying and ending the threat to the child.
Strozewski v. Strozewski, No. 29A02-1412-DR-885, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., June 16, 2015).
Dissolution was filed in a preferred venue under Trial Rule 75(A)(8), and although preferred venue may lie in more than one county, if an action is filed in a county of preferred venue, change of venue cannot be granted.