Ind. Code 35-38-4-2(a)(5), which permits the State to appeal “from an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to preclude further prosecution of one (1) or more counts of an information or indictment,” focuses on the effect of the trial court’s ruling: whether the ruling on the defendant’s motion prevents the State from presenting evidence necessary to prove its case.
In re Adoption of M.J.H., No. 23A-AD-2769, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., June 10, 2024).
Ind. Code chapter 31-19-5, governing the putative father registry, applies where a mother does not consent to an adoption. The relevance of a mother’s execution of consent to an adoption is merely the timing for her to provide information about a putative father.
Brackenridge v. State, No. 23A-CR-2496, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., May 29, 2024).
To be classified as a serious violent felon, a defendant must have been convicted of a statutory listed felony. If a defendant’s qualifying felony conviction is reduced to a misdemeanor by virtue of the AMS statute, a defendant would no longer qualify as a serious violent felon.
Duke Energy Ind., LLC v. Noblesville, No. 23S-PL-130, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., May 30, 2024).
Both trial courts and the utility regulatory commission can hear a municipality’s action to enforce an ordinance, but only the commission can decide whether an ordinance implicating a public-utility function is unreasonable.
Duke Energy Ind., LLC v. Carmel, No. 23S-EX-129, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., May 30, 2024).
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission properly held that city ordinance was unreasonable and void because it threatened to impose unreasonable expenses on an energy company, which would in turn impact all of the energy company’s customers throughout Indiana.