The thirty-seven-month time period between the temporary custody order and the permanent custody order was an extraordinary delay that prejudiced mother and violated her due process rights. Trial courts have a statutory duty under Ind. Code § 31-17-2-6 to expedite custody proceedings.
Frye v. State, No. 23A-CR-1691, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 31, 2024).
The ability to consent is a unifying theme to the separate situations of proscribed conduct constituting Level 3 felony rape; a defendant should be able to ask the alleged victim questions about their shared sexual history to determine whether there is any basis by which defendant could defend themselves by arguing the alleged were consensual.
M.M. v. L.P., No. 23A-PO-2089, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 5, 2024).
The trial court was not required to transfer a pending protection order case to the special judge handling parties’ post-dissolution matters when the protection order did not relate to any pending post-dissolution proceedings and did not impact parenting time.
Henderson v. State, No. 24A-CR-667, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 26, 2024).
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(c)(1) proscribes the application of alternative misdemeanor sentencing (AMS) to a second felony within three years when “the person has committed a prior unrelated felony for which judgment was entered as a conviction of a Class A misdemeanor.” The statute employs past tense, as opposed to prospective, terminology; anticipated AMS for a prior unrelated felony would not bar AMS in a current case.
Coonce v. State, No. 23A-CR-1920, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 29, 2024).
Prior unrelated vehicular substance offenses used to support a habitual vehicular substance offender enhancement may be either felony or misdemeanor convictions.