Statute requires only one operating stoplight on a vehicle, so motorist whose vehicle had one operating stoplight and one burned out was not in violation of the traffic law, and officer’s good faith belief that an unoperational stoplight was an infraction did not justify stopping the motorist, so that motion to suppress should have been granted.
Criminal
State v. Joslyn, No. 49S04-1102-CR-85, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 16, 2011)
When protective order notice was left at subject’s home but the return of service did not indicate that notice was also mailed to last address as required by Trial Rule 4.1, subject’s statement to police and admission at trial that he received the notice in combination with evidence of T.R. 4.1 notice attempt were sufficient to support his invasion of privacy conviction.
State v. Tharp, No. 49S02-1005-CR-256, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 16, 2011)
Actual notice of a protective order sufficient for a conviction of invasion of privacy need not come from an agent of the state, but in this case conviction is reversed because the only evidence defendant knew of the protective order was testimony the protected person told him about it and at the same time said the order was no longer valid.
Romo v. State, No. 49S04-1009-CR-499, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 9, 2011)
“[W]ritten English translations of foreign language recordings may be admitted as substantive evidence and . . . the recordings themselves generally should be admitted and played as well.”
Matlock v. State, No. 49A02-1006-CR-609, __ N.E.2D __ (Ind. Ct. App., Jan. 21, 2011)
“[W]here the possibility exists that a defendant accused of OWI may at some point in the future regain competency and be released back into society, which release also may include the defendant driving, the State may pursue an OWI conviction even if the defendant’s incompetency caused he or she to be detained for a period in excess of the maximum possible sentence for OWI.”