Overrules cases holding that an element of a charge dismissed by plea agreement cannot be used as an aggravating sentencing factor, and holds that instead elements or conduct involved in dismissed charges may be used in sentencing unless the parties provide otherwise in their plea agreement.
Criminal
Heaton v. State, No. 48S02-1206-CR-350, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Mar. 5, 2013).
A probation revocation court must apply the preponderance standard, not probable cause, in determining whether the state has proved the defendant committed a new offense.
Santiago v. State, No. 45A03-1207-CR-304, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Mar. 5, 2013).
Taken as a whole, trial court’s presumption of innocence instructions were proper, even though they did not contain express direction that the jurors must fit the evidence to the presumption of innocence or reconcile the evidence on the theory defendant was innocent.
K.W. v. State, No. 49S02-1301-JV-20, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 22, 2013)
Evidence was insufficient to prove element of “forcibly” resisting law enforcement; suggests legislative scrutiny of distinction between law enforcement officer and school-discipline officer for purposes of resisting law enforcement offense.
Sickels v. State, No. 20S03-1206-CR-308, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 22, 2013).
“[A] custodial parent may be a ‘victim’ for purposes of restitution based on a child-support arrearage even if the children have been emancipated.”