Even though the window tint of defendant’s vehicle was not quite dark enough to establish a Window Tint Statute violation, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for a Window Tint violation when he could not “clearly recognize or identify the occupant inside” “coupled with the fact that the actual tint closely border[ed] the statutory limit.”
Criminal
Salinas v. Texas, No. 12-246, __ U.S.__ (June 17, 2013).
Plurality opinion concludes that, if an individual not in custody is voluntarily answering police questions and refuses or fails to answer an incriminating question, he must expressly invoke his privilege against self-incrimination when the question is asked in order to object at trial that the state’s characterizing his silence as evidence of guilt violates the privilege; opinion does not resolve whether at trial the state can use the silence as evidence of guilt if the defendant properly invokes the Fifth Amendment during the questioning.
Alleyne v. United States, No. 11-9335, __ U.S. __ (June 17, 2013).
“[A]ny fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.”
Crocker v. State, No. 79A04-1210-CR-542, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., June 18, 2013).
Motorist told to sit in squad car after being stopped on the highway was in “custody” when questioned by the officer in the car.
Maryland v. King, No. 12–207, __ U.S. __ (June 3, 2013).
When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.