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Case Clips

Published by the Indiana Office of Court Services

Criminal

Willis v. State, No. 49A02-1310-CR-854, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 11, 2014).

July 17, 2014 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: Appeals, M. Barnes, T. Crone

Affirms criminal trespass conviction based on evidence defendant was seen running near the scene of the alleged crime not long after a security alarm was activated and voices and noises were heard inside the premises.

Wright v. State, No. 45A05-1310-CR-526, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 11, 2014).

July 17, 2014 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: Appeals, M. May

Removal of juror on basis he was refusing to deliberate was reversible error.

Berry v. State, No. 49S04-1406-CR-416, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 27, 2014).

July 3, 2014 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: L. Rush, Supreme

“[W]hen a trial court accepts a plea agreement with an executed time cap, its discretion to impose further punitive conditions of probation does not extend beyond what the plea agreement specifies.”

Tin Thang v. State, No. 49S04-1402-CR-72, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 27, 2014).

July 3, 2014 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: B. Dickson, S. David, Supreme

Distinguishing caselaw holding that, for the OWI offense, endangerment cannot be inferred from intoxication alone, affirms public intoxication conviction on basis defendant’s presence while intoxicated with a car at a gas station supported an inference he operated the vehicle while intoxicated and thus committed the public intoxication element of endangering himself or others.

Gaddie v. State, No. 49S02-1312-CR-789, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 27, 2014).

July 3, 2014 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: B. Dickson, Supreme

“To avoid conflict with the Fourth Amendment . . . the statute defining the offense of Resisting Law Enforcement by fleeing after being ordered to stop must be construed to require that a law enforcement officer’s order to stop be based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”

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Case Clips is a weekly publication of the Indiana Office of Court Services featuring appellate opinions curated by IOCS staff for Indiana judges.

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