Rush, C.J.
Any Hoosier selected to serve on a civil jury will be instructed by the judge on their distinct and important role: “Judges and jurors perform different tasks. I will instruct you on the law . . . . You will decide the facts in this case.” [Footnote omitted.] Given this clear delineation of duties, our trial courts can set aside a jury’s verdict only in rare circumstances. We review the tragic facts of this case under one such circumstance to determine whether a jury verdict was clearly erroneous as contrary to or unsupported by the evidence.
Here, a pedestrian trying to board an IndyGo bus fell into the road as the bus left a curbside stop, was run over, and died of his injuries. The pedestrian’s mother, on behalf of his estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against IndyGo alleging negligence. In response, IndyGo asserted that the pedestrian was contributorily negligent, which would bar the estate from recovering damages. During trial, IndyGo moved for judgment in its favor, arguing the evidence—including video footage and the pedestrian’s high blood-alcohol content—established the pedestrian was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. But the trial court denied that motion. Then, after the jury found in the estate’s favor, IndyGo raised a similar argument in a motion to correct error. But the court also denied that motion.
We affirm. In reaching that decision, we first explain why we review de novo the trial court’s denial of IndyGo’s motion to correct error. Then, in conducting that review, we hold the evidence presented to the jury does not establish the pedestrian was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. As a result, the verdict was not clearly erroneous as contrary to or unsupported by the evidence.
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IndyGo—appealing the trial court’s denial of its motion to correct error—argues the verdict is clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence and maintains the evidence establishes Fergerson was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for two reasons. IndyGo first asserts that the video footage alone establishes that Fergerson was negligent in reaching out to touch the moving bus, especially while intoxicated. And it also contends that Fergerson’s conduct violated two statutes and thus constituted negligence per se. [Footnote omitted.] We disagree on both points.
In reaching those conclusions, we first explain why we review the denial of IndyGo’s motion to correct error under the same de novo standard as if IndyGo had appealed the denial of its Rule 50(A) motion for judgment on the evidence at trial. We then turn to the evidence presented to the jury and hold that the trial court did not err in denying IndyGo’s motion because that evidence does not lead to a sole inference that Fergerson was contributorily negligent.
I. We review the trial court’s denial of IndyGo’s motion to correct error de novo.
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Trial Rule 50(A) permits a trial court to withdraw from a jury any issue that is “not supported by sufficient evidence” or to reverse a verdict that is “clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence” and enter judgment. T.R. 50(A). When considering such a motion at trial, the court has no factfinding role and simply assesses whether “the evidence supports any reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant.”…
In a Rule 59(J) motion to correct error, a party can argue that the verdict is either “against the weight of the evidence” or “clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence.”…
Thus, Rule 59(J)—like Rule 50(A)—permits a trial court to enter judgment if the jury’s verdict is “clearly erroneous” because it is not supported by sufficient evidence. In this way, “both rules mandate that the motion be granted when there is insufficient evidence under the law to support a verdict.” Sch. City of Hammond Dist. v. Rueth, 71 N.E.3d 33, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Huff v. Travelers Indem. Co., 363 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ind. 1977)), trans. denied. So when a party raises this Rule 50(A) argument in a Rule 59(J) motion to correct error, the trial court reviews the evidence as if it were considering a Rule 50(A) motion raised before judgment at trial. And in both instances, de novo review is appropriate because the “paper record alone is enough for a reviewing court to assess whether, without any weighing, the evidence supports any reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant.” Cosme, 232 N.E.3d at 1152.
II. The evidence supports reasonable inferences that Fergerson was not contributorily negligent.
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To evaluate whether the video footage from the IndyGo bus’s monitoring system alone establishes Fergerson was contributorily negligent, we consider its quality, including “whether the video is grainy or otherwise obscured, the lighting, the angle, the audio and whether the video is a complete depiction of the events at issue, among other things.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2017). In conducting this review, we defer to the factfinder unless the video evidence contradicts the factfinder’s conclusion such that “no reasonable person can view the video and come to a different conclusion.” Id. at 695.
The video footage here, viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate, does not support a sole inference that Fergerson was negligent….
Because of the obstructed view of Fergerson’s body, particularly at the moment he fell, we cannot conclude that the video presents a single, undisputed account of his conduct during the incident. To be sure, the footage supports a reasonable inference that Fergerson acted negligently by lunging for or reaching out to touch the moving bus, perhaps due to intoxication or his sciatica. But the footage also supports at least two other reasonable inferences that he was not negligent: Fergerson, through no unreasonable action and simply by accident, stumbled and then raised his arm in an involuntary attempt to brace himself as he fell; or the bus’s sudden and unexpected momentum caused him to lose his balance as he carefully approached the bus and involuntarily reached out to stop himself from falling. [Footnote omitted.]
Both latter inferences are supported by evidence favorable to the Estate. Fergerson routinely rode the bus without incident. And though he suffered from sciatica, it’s reasonable to conclude that he exercised the degree of care of a person facing similar circumstances by getting up and approaching the bus slowly…
Evidence of Fergerson’s BAC likewise does not disturb the reasonable inferences that he was not negligent, as that evidence does not lead to a sole inference that his intoxication contributed to his injuries….
From this evidence, coupled with the video footage, a reasonable jury could have inferred that Fergerson’s tolerance for alcohol minimized any impairment from his BAC level and thus concluded that his intoxication was not a proximate cause of his injuries. [Footnote omitted.] Thus, because the video footage and other evidence allow for multiple, reasonable inferences about Fergerson’s conduct and the cause of his fall, we cannot conclude that IndyGo established he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
We likewise cannot conclude that the evidence leads to a sole inference that Fergerson’s conduct constituted negligence per se under Indiana Code sections 9-21-17-5 or 7.1-5-1-6. Section 9-21-17-5 prohibits pedestrians from “suddenly leav[ing] a curb or other place of safety” and walking or running into the path of a vehicle “that is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” I.C. § 9-21-17-5. The video footage permits a reasonable inference that Fergerson did not suddenly leave the curb by walking or running into the path of the bus.
Section 7.1-5-1-6, on the other hand, prohibits a person from being intoxicated when using public transportation and requires that the person’s intoxication endangered their own life…
To be sure, this is a close case. But our role is not to stand in the place of the factfinder. Instead, we are confined to determining whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Estate, the only reasonable inference is that Fergerson was contributorily negligent. On this record, we cannot reach that conclusion. Six jurors, who were the most attentive and asked the most questions either party’s attorney had ever seen, did not find that Fergerson was contributorily negligent. And that jury was properly instructed on contributory negligence and the two statutes on which IndyGo relied, which we presume the jury followed. Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 20 (Ind. 2015). Additionally, both the trial court and a judge of our Court of Appeals found that IndyGo did not establish Fergerson was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Because the evidence presented to the jury does not support a sole inference to the contrary, we cannot find these conclusions unreasonable.
Conclusion
For the reasons provided above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of IndyGo’s motion to correct error.
Goff and Molter, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Massa, J., joins.
Slaughter, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would either deny transfer, letting the court of appeals’ opinion stand, or reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to enter judgment for IndyGo.
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