Weissmann, J.
The fundamental right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution1 and Article 1, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution2, “imposes an affirmative duty on the government to ensure that criminal defendants receive the swift administration of justice.” Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 611 (Ind. 2020). Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) implements this right by setting a strict one-year deadline for the State to bring a defendant to trial. This deadline may be extended only under limited circumstances, including when “delays [are] caused by a defendant.” Crim. R. 4(C). Although Criminal Rule 4(C) imposes on the State the burden of bringing defendants to trial without creating any reciprocal duty by defendants to act to ensure their own timely trial, these roles were effectively reversed in this case.
As the State struggled for 10 months to first collect and then share documents essential to its prosecution of Desiree Heitz for identity theft, Heitz repeatedly declined to request a trial date. The State, seemingly unprepared for trial, also did not request a trial date. This prompted the trial court, in accordance with its own policy, to refrain from setting the case for trial. When Heitz eventually requested a trial and it was scheduled for a date 15 months after she was charged, the trial court determined that Heitz was responsible for the delay and refused to discharge her under Criminal Rule 4(C). But Heitz’s act of not seeking a trial date, which the State also did not request, did not extend the one-year deadline for her trial. This is because her failure to request a trial date did not constitute “delays caused by a defendant” within the meaning of Criminal Rule 4(C). Because the State ultimately failed to bring Heitz to trial within the 4(C) period, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant Heitz’s motion to dismiss.
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Heitz challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss, arguing that Criminal Rule 4(C)’s one-year deadline for bringing her to trial expired before she sought discharge by moving to dismiss the charges on February 14, 2024.
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The catalyst for this dispute is the trial court’s policy for setting trial dates in criminal prosecutions. Under the policy, the trial court routinely asked defendants whether they were requesting a trial setting. If the defendants declined to request the court set the trial dates—even if the State also had not sought them—the court generally viewed the defendants’ declinations as delay caused by the defendants that could not be attributed to the State for purposes of its one-year prosecution deadline under Criminal Rule 4(C). Although we appreciate the trial court’s effort to manage its considerable docket efficiently, this approach effectively dismantles the underpinnings of Criminal Rule 4(C) by transferring to the defendant the State’s duty of timely prosecution.
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Like the local rule invalidated in Ferman, the trial court’s policy here incorrectly shifts the burden of prosecutorial timeliness from the State to the defendant.
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We understand the challenge that trial courts face in efficiently managing their dockets and the good-faith effort to create clear, consistent procedures. Still, such procedures must align with the constitutional and statutory rights of defendants and the corresponding responsibilities of the State.
Having established the troubling vagaries of the trial court’s policy, we turn to the parties’ respective Criminal Rule 4(C) claims. The parties disagree about how to categorize three specific periods in this case: (1) February 14 to March 28, 2023 (42 days); (2) September 19 to October 2, 2023 (13 days); and (3) October 2 to October 24, 2023 (22 days). During each of these periods, the State’s discovery was outstanding, no trial date had been established, and Heitz declined to request a trial date.
The State contends these purported delays should be attributed to Heitz because she explicitly stated she was not requesting a trial date during these periods. Heitz argues her actions did not extend the Criminal Rule 4(C) deadline because they resulted from the State’s failure to provide mandatory discovery, not from any affirmative action on her part. Whether “a particular delay in bringing a defendant to trial violates the speedy trial guarantee largely depends on the specific circumstances of the case.” Payton v. State, 905 N.E.2d 508, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quotations omitted).
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The critical question here is not whether Heitz requested a trial date, but whether her actions or inactions affirmatively extended the one-year period allowed by Criminal Rule 4(C). The defendant has no duty to bring herself to trial and need not object before the year period expires if no trial date is set. Young v. State, 765 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Therefore, simply not requesting a trial date cannot be construed as constituting an affirmative action that extends Rule 4(C)’s one-year period. And “[t]he direction [in Rule 4] to discharge is mandatory; nothing will prevent the rule’s operation save its own exceptions.” See Crosby v. State, 597 N.E.2d 984, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (considering a motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(B), which sets a 70day period for trial once the defendant files a motion under that rule).
After careful review of the record and precedent, we find that both the February 2023 and September-October 2023 delays should not be attributed to Heitz in line with the policy underlying the discovery exception: that “delay” caused by the State’s tardy discovery is not chargeable to the defendant for Criminal Rule 4(C) purposes. See Wellman, 210 N.E.3d at 816. The purported delays from these disputed periods all stem from the same underlying challenge: Heitz’s inability to properly prepare for trial due to the State’s ongoing failure to provide discovery.
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Our ruling does not expand the discovery exception; rather, it prevents the trial court’s improper policy from nullifying the discovery exception altogether. The dissent’s concern about subverting trial rules overlooks that it was the trial court’s policy—not our application of the discovery exception—that undermined Criminal Rule 4(C) by shifting to the defendant the State’s burden of bringing a prosecution to trial. Addressing one aspect of this burden-shifting while preserving another would provide no meaningful remedy for this Criminal Rule 4(C) violation. Nor would it deter prosecutors from dragging their feet on discovery matters so long that they do not timely bring criminal prosecutions to trial.
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When the trial court scheduled the trial for March 11, 2024—a date outside the one-year Criminal Rule 4(C) deadline—Heitz properly objected. And when the trial court declined to reschedule the trial, Heitz timely moved for dismissal under Criminal Rule 4(C) on February 14, 2024. Given that the one-year period had expired the month before, Heitz was entitled to dismissal and discharge. The trial court erred in denying Heitz’s motion to dismiss.
We recognize the practical challenges faced by all participants in our criminal justice system.3 But Criminal Rule 4(C) establishes clear requirements that cannot be circumvented by local court policies, no matter how well-intentioned those policies may be. The rule places an affirmative duty on the State to bring defendants to trial within one year, with no corresponding obligation for defendants to facilitate their own prosecution.
In this case, the trial court’s policy of attributing delay to defendants who do not request trial dates fundamentally misapplies Criminal Rule 4(C) and improperly shifts the burden from the State to the defendant. Heitz cannot be faulted for declining to request a trial date while awaiting discovery that the State was obligated—but repeatedly failed—to provide. The State’s prolonged failure to meet its discovery obligations, spanning nearly 11 months and involving eight separate prosecutors, cannot be transformed into “a delay caused by the defendant” under Rule 4(C).
After factoring in the 29-day period when Heitz was in Johnson County custody, the Criminal Rule 4(C) deadline was January 15, 2024. The trial date of March 11, 2024, exceeds this deadline. As “[t]he State bears the burden to prosecute a given case within the bounds of Rule 4(C)” and failed to do so here, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Heitz’s motion to dismiss and remand with instructions to grant the motion.
Reversed and remanded.
Pyle, J., concurs.
Felix, J., dissents with a separate opinion.
Felix, J., dissenting.
It should be immediately noted that I agree with the majority’s disapproval of the trial court’s policy of putting the onus on the defendant to request a trial date. Further, I also agree that “[t]he critical question here is . . . whether [Heitz’s] actions or inactions affirmatively extended the one-year period allowed by Criminal Rule 4(C).”
Based on this record, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that Heitz’s actions did not extend the one-year period. Heitz’s actions at the February 14 proceeding extended the one-year period, and consequently, the trial court’s denial of her motion for discharge should be affirmed for the reasons set forth below. “When a defendant moves for discharge, he bears the burden of showing that he has not been timely brought to trial and that he is not responsible for the delay.” State v. Harper, 135 N.E.3d 962, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, cert. denied). Heitz has failed to do so here.
First, the trial court’s policy does not apply to the February 14 appearance. There, the trial court asked Heitz about the status of the case, and Heitz told the trial court, without any prompting from the court, that she wished to delay proceedings. Almost immediately after the case was identified for the record, defense counsel stated, “Not pursuing a trial setting, Judge, just a pretrial in due course.” Tr. Vol. II at 30. At the close of the conference, the trial court asked, “[Y]ou’re not requesting a trial date, right?” and Heitz confirmed that no trial was being sought; in other words, as I interpret the request, Heitz was affirmatively requesting no trial date. Id. at 45. Notably, in her Appellant’s brief, Heitz concedes that, on February 14, she “asked for [an] extension[],” meaning she delayed the proceedings.
Second, the discovery exception should not apply to Heitz’s continuance at the February 14 proceeding. The discovery exception applies when “a trial court grants a defendant’s motion for continuance because of the State’s failure to comply with the defendant’s discovery requests.
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Because discovery was not the sole reason for the continuance, the discovery exception should be unavailable.
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Further, we have held that continuances based on communication issues alone extend the C.R. 4(C) deadline. Bik v. State, 211 N.E.3d 594, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (concluding seven continuances for communication issues were not covered by the discovery exception and thus extended the C.R.4(C) deadline). From this record, there is no way to discern the relative weight that was placed on each factor at play, but Heitz has failed to demonstrate that discovery was the only or primary reason that she was unable to prepare for trial and needed a continuance on February 14.
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Based on a determination that Heitz delayed the proceedings on February 14, the C.R. 4(C) deadline would have been extended by 42 days, moving the deadline to February 25, 2024. Under this conclusion, the trial court unquestionably set the trial court past the C.R. 4(C) deadline when it scheduled the trial for March 11, 2024. However, Heitz stopped the C.R. 4(C) clock when she filed her motion for discharge on February 14, Ferman v. State, 232 N.E.3d 133, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), and C.R. 4(C) motions for discharge that are filed prematurely are properly denied, Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 487 n.21 (Ind. 2001). In sum, I would conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Heitz’s motion for discharge.