Rush, C. J.
Since our state’s founding, the Indiana Constitution has required justice to be administered “without delay.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12; see also Ind. Const. of 1816, art. 1, § 11. One way our judicial system effectuates that mandate is through our procedural rules. Indeed, our rules of trial procedure “shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Ind. Trial Rule 1. To that end, Trial Rule 41(E) allows a litigant to seek dismissal of a civil case for a party’s failure to move the case along. But a trial court can only consider the merits of a motion invoking Rule 41(E) if it is timely. To be timely, the motion must be filed after no action has been taken in the case for at least sixty days and before the other party resumes prosecution.
Here, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ case under Rule 41(E) and, alternatively, under the equitable doctrine of laches. The trial court granted the motion based on Rule 41(E), finding the plaintiffs’ case had laid “dormant for longer times than many Pacific Rim volcanoes.” In appealing that decision, the plaintiffs argue the trial court erred because the defendant’s motion was untimely for Rule 41(E) purposes. We agree.
Although the plaintiffs did little to advance their case for several years, they resumed prosecution by requesting a case-management conference before the defendant moved for dismissal under Rule 41(E). Thus, the case could not be dismissed under that rule, and we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. We also reject the defendant’s alternative argument, as we hold that the equitable doctrine of laches does not apply here. Accordingly, we reverse.
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As the one filing a complaint, the plaintiff bears the primary burden of moving a case along to achieve speedy justice. And a defendant has tools to hold the plaintiff to that burden, including Trial Rule 41(E) and the equitable doctrine of laches. But these tools operate in distinct circumstances.
Rule 41(E) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a plaintiff’s civil case “when no action has been taken” for at least sixty days. T.R. 41(E). But for that motion to be “timely,” this Court established over fifty years ago that it must be filed “before the plaintiff resumes prosecution.” State v. McClaine, 300 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. 1973). Thus, a Rule 41(E) motion is timely only if it is filed “after the sixty-day period has expired and before the plaintiff resumes prosecution.” Id. (emphasis omitted). If a defendant fails to meet this bright-line requirement, Rule 41(E) is not a proper basis for dismissal. See id. at 344–45; see also, e.g., Babchuk, 30 N.E.3d at 1254. Laches, however, is a defense that may bar a plaintiff from bringing a claim that seeks equitable relief if the defendant satisfies certain requirements. See SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne–Allen Cnty. Airport Auth., 831 N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ind. 2005).
Resolving this case entails clarifying both avenues for dismissal without passing judgment on the merits of the Farmers’ claim. As for Rule 41(E), the Bank asks us to depart from our well-established timeliness requirement because the Farmers did “nothing to advance the case” for “over a decade.” The Farmers, on the other hand, contend the trial court erred in dismissing their case because they “resumed active litigation” by “moving for a case management conference” before the Bank sought dismissal. We agree with the Farmers. Because the Bank moved for dismissal under Rule 41(E) after the Farmers had resumed prosecution, that rule is not a proper basis for dismissal. Thus, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. And though the court did not dismiss the case on laches, we hold that it does not apply here.
I. Dismissal was not available under Trial Rule 41(E) since the Farmers resumed prosecution before the Bank sought dismissal.
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Here, like the defendants in McClaine and Babchuk, the Bank moved for dismissal under Rule 41(E) after the Farmers resumed prosecution by requesting a case management conference. Indeed, that request evinced the Farmers’ intent to move forward with litigation. Though it’s true that the Farmers did not prosecute their claim for several years before that request, their inaction does not excuse the Bank from its burden to satisfy Rule 41(E)’s timeliness requirement.
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II. The equitable doctrine of laches does not bar the Farmers’ legal claim for money damages.
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The Farmers seek damages for the Bank’s alleged failure to conduct a commercially reasonable sale—a claim for legal, not equitable, relief. The Bank has not identified a single case from our appellate courts, and we are aware of none, in which laches barred an otherwise timely legal claim for money damages. Though we recognize that other jurisdictions have held that laches can apply to some legal claims, see 30A C.J.S. Equity § 140 (2024), the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently “cautioned against invoking laches to bar legal relief,” Petrella, 572 U.S. at 678 (collecting cases). The Bank has provided no reason either below or on appeal for us to disregard that caution here.
Conclusion
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the case under Trial Rule 41(E) because the Farmers resumed prosecution before the Bank moved for dismissal under that rule. And we find no reason to bar the Farmers’ claim based on the equitable doctrine of laches. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s dismissal order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Court, applying our fifty-year-old precedent in State v. McClaine, 300 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1973), reverses the trial court and holds that dismissal is not proper because the defendant’s Trial Rule 41(E) motion was not timely and should not have been granted. Although the Court applies McClaine faithfully, I believe McClaine was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered.
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In sum, Rule 41(E) does not treat the bank’s motion as stale. McClaine may require that result, but I prefer to enforce our rules as written and not our strained, non-textual interpretations of them. Thus, I would overrule McClaine and treat the bank’s motion as timely. Then I would review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs failed to show sufficient cause for their failure to prosecute. On this record, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice under Rule 41(E).