Massa, J.
The Indiana Constitution imposes on the General Assembly a duty “to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.” Ind. Const. art. 8, § 1. To help finance this lofty goal, our constitutional framers established a “Common School fund,” the principal of which “may be increased, but shall never be diminished.” Id. §§ 2, 3. Among other sources of revenue, this Fund “shall consist” of “all forfeitures which may accrue.” Id. § 2.
In implementing this constitutional command, Indiana’s Civil Forfeiture Statute directs the transfer of proceeds from seized property “to the treasurer of state for deposit in the common school fund.” Ind. Code § 34-24-1-4(d) (2018). But before these proceeds accrue to the Fund, the Statute permits the allocation of forfeiture revenue to reimburse law enforcement costs. Whether this cost offsetting is constitutional under article 8, section 2 has been “an unresolved question” by this Court. See Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1142 n.3 (Ind. 2011). Today, however, we answer that question in the affirmative.
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Discussion and Decision
Taxpayers argue that “[b]oth versions of the Civil Forfeiture Statute violate the Indiana Constitution based on a straightforward application of Article 8.” Appellants’ Br. at 16. They insist that “‘all forfeitures’” belong to the Common School Fund, not just a percentage of those forfeitures. Id. (quoting Ind. Const. art. 8, § 2).
The City counters that the legislature may define the circumstances under which forfeiture proceeds vest in the Fund and that “awards of law enforcement costs are not forfeitures” that accrue to the state. City’s Br. at 16. The Prosecutor’s Office adds that the scope of article 8, section 2 does not include civil forfeitures and that, even if it did, it confers no private right of enforcement. Instead, the Prosecutor’s Office asserts, the General Assembly can authoritatively define article 8, section 2’s scope. Prosecutor’s Br. at 21.
I. Do Taxpayers have standing?
A threshold question for this Court is whether Taxpayers have standing to litigate their claim.
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A. From the mid-nineteenth century through today, our standing jurisprudence reveals a gradual shift toward judicial restraint
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B. Taxpayer standing and public standing are distinct doctrines.
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By adopting the standard articulated in Justice Sullivan’s Embry concurrence, we hold that, to establish taxpayer standing, a plaintiff must (1) raise a challenge seeking to vindicate an express constitutional limitation on the expenditure of public funds, (2) demonstrate some personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, and (3) show “extreme circumstances” warranting judicial intervention. [Footnotes omitted.]
C. Taxpayers have standing to litigate their claim under our taxpayer-standing doctrine.
In applying our standard here, we conclude that Taxpayers have standing to litigate their claim. First, their claim clearly implicates an express constitutional limitation on the expenditure or appropriation of public funds. See Ind. Const. art. 8, § 3 (prohibiting the principal of the Common School Fund from being “diminished”). And because this Fund is a “public fund of the state” in which all taxpayers have an interest in preventing its “unlawful waste” or misappropriation, Taxpayers meet the second prong of our standard. See Mitsch, 234 Ind. at 290, 289, 125 N.E.2d at 23. Finally, because Taxpayers challenge the Civil Forfeiture Statute as an abuse of the legislative prerogative, and because the Prosecutor’s Office agrees that this case “raise[s] a substantial question of Indiana constitutional law,” Prosecutor’s Resp. Mot. Trans. at 2, Taxpayers successfully present the “extreme circumstances” necessary to establish standing. See Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 488; Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 168 (Sullivan, J., concurring). In so concluding, this “Court does not overstep [its] limitations in deciding this challenge.” Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 169 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
We also emphasize that, had Taxpayers brought their claim as a private party—whether in defending against civil or criminal liability or in seeking damages—this Court would have properly denied them standing…
II. Article 8, section 2 applies to civil forfeitures.
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From this brief historical inquiry, we have little doubt that our constitutional framers understood that “a conviction on the underlying criminal activity is not a prerequisite for forfeiture.” Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ind. 1995). And because “Indiana’s system for civil forfeitures proceeds under” article 8, Serrano, 946 N.E.2d at 1141, we hold that the Civil Forfeiture Statute falls within the scope of article 8, section 2.
III. Article 8, section 2 permits the legislature to determine how and when forfeiture proceeds accrue to the Common School Fund.
Indiana’s Civil Forfeiture Statute directs the transfer of proceeds from seized property “to the treasurer of state for deposit in the common school fund.” I.C. § 34-24-1-4(d). But before these proceeds accrue to the Fund, the Statute permits the allocation of forfeiture revenue to reimburse law enforcement costs. Id. Taxpayers argue that “the Civil Forfeiture Statute violates Article 8 of the Indiana Constitution by diverting forfeiture revenue from the common school fund.” Appellants’ Br. at 17.
To determine the constitutionality of the Civil Forfeiture Statute, we must examine “the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification” as well as “the purpose and structure of our constitution.” City of Hammond, 119 N.E.3d at 79 (emphases added) (internal quotations omitted).
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Conclusion
We acknowledge the critical role public schools play in nurturing our children to become productive and law-abiding citizens. There is, after all, “a legitimate, and often a close, connection between ignorance and crime.” Ind. Dep’t of Public Instruction Fourteenth (Third Biennial) Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Indiana 52 (1866). But should the legislature decide to repeal the Civil Forfeiture Statute entirely, leaving neither the Common School Fund nor law enforcement with an important source of revenue, would that present Taxpayers with a constitutional claim? Would that violate article 8, section 2’s mandate that the Fund “shall consist of . . . all forfeitures which may accrue”? We think the answer to these rhetorical questions is a resounding “no.” “[W]hether it is good policy to do [so],” however, “is a matter with the legislature,” not for this Court to decide. [Footnote omitted.] State v. Indiana & I.S.R. Co., 133 Ind. 69, 80, 32 N.E. 817, 820 (1892).
Because our constitution’s text, structure, and history clearly show that article 8, section 2 was “not self-acting in [its] operation,” Meyer, 63 Ind. at 40, we hold that the General Assembly may decide how and when forfeiture proceeds accrue to the Common School Fund.
Judgment affirmed.
Goff, J., concurs. Rush, C.J., concurs in result in Part I, concurs in Part II, and dissents from Part III, with separate opinion in which Justice David joins in part.
David, J., concurs in result in Part I and concurs in Parts II and III. Slaughter, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.
Rush, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I take no issue with my colleagues’ conclusion that the plaintiffs have standing as taxpayers, or with their analysis that Article 8, Section 2 applies to civil forfeitures.
I disagree with my colleagues, however, on two fronts. First, their broader discussion of the public-standing doctrine—properly characterized as dicta—is imprudent. It undercuts an important, long-recognized instrument for maintaining the separation of powers and checks and balances in Indiana, and it mistreats this Court’s precedent. Second, I disagree that the current civil-forfeiture statute is constitutional. If the legislature enacts a civil-forfeiture scheme, the amount collected above the cost of obtaining the forfeiture must grow the Common School Fund. Here, the current statute’s allocation scheme neither tracks offset costs nor increases the Fund. Thus, the legislature overstepped a constitutional limit on its authority.
I therefore concur in result in Part I, concur in full in Part II, and dissent from Part III.
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David, J., joins in Part A.
Slaughter, J., concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the judgment below for Defendants and against Plaintiffs must be affirmed. But I reach that result for different reasons. I would hold that Plaintiffs lack standing under the only standard consistent with our Constitution’s mandate of separate governmental powers. In my view, Article 3, Section 1 requires, among other things, that a plaintiff suffer individualized injury in fact and not a generalized harm indistinct from the public at large. Our prevailing judicial doctrines that permit taxpayer and citizen (also known as public-interest) standing are incompatible with this constitutional command. Although I have serious concerns with the way Indiana carries out civil forfeitures, see generally Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari), I would not reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim. Instead, I would dismiss their complaint for lack of standing and await another case—brought by the State or by a private party with a concrete, particularized injury—to address the important constitutional questions that this and other civil-forfeiture cases implicate.
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