Under Indiana RICO offense, “continuity” is relevant to proving that the incidents of criminal conduct were “not isolated”; but unlike federal RICO, “continuity” is not itself a discrete element of the offense.
Supreme
McElfresh v. State, No. 32S01-1511-CR-667, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., March 3, 2016).
Even true statements may be coercive enough to influence a witness and will therefore support conviction for obstruction of justice if they were intended for that purpose.
Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Division of Cooper Industries, Inc., No. 49S00-1502-MI-119, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., March 2, 2016).
The Indiana Product of Liability Act statute of repose does not apply in cases where there is prolonged exposure to inherently dangerous foreign substances like asbestos.
Tyson v. State, No. 45S03-1509-CR-528, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., Feb. 25, 2016).
Statute requiring “a person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction” to likewise register in Indiana did not violate Indiana ex post facto clause as applied to Texas offender who moved to Indiana after 2006 enactment of that statute. Texas law already required offender to register; maintaining that status in Indiana was not punitive under the intent-effects test.
State v. Zerbe, No. 49S05-1509-MI-529, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., Feb. 25, 2016).
Michigan sex offender was not distinguishable from offender in Tyson v. State, even though Michigan enacted its registration requirement two years after defendant’s offense. Relevant question was not whether Michigan registration requirement was ex post facto law, but only that the requirement existed at the time offender moved to Indiana.