Defendant’s personal waiver of second-phase jury trial was required; counsel could not waive it on defendant’s behalf, even though defendant had just been through first phase of bifurcated trial.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of prior case file as evidence of defendant’s prior conviction, because file was readily and publicly available and cause number was repeatedly an unambiguously identified on the record; however, better practice would have been to formally enter the relevant documents into the record.
Supreme
Citizens Action Coalition of Ind. v. Koch, No. 49S00-1510-PL-00607, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., April 19, 2016).
Whether the work product exception within the Indiana Access to Public Records Act applies to the Indiana General Assembly is a non-justiciable question.
Gaff v. Indiana-Purdue University of Fort Wayne, No. 02S03-1604-PL-201, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., April 22, 2016).
“[W]hile the plaintiff’s cause of action arises under federal law, summary judgment proceedings arising under Indiana Trial Rule 56 are governed by Indiana summary judgment procedure and jurisprudence.”
Gibson v. State, No. 22S00-1206-DP-360, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., April 12, 2016).
Allowing State to amend death-penalty charging information shortly before trial—changing the aggravator from having “committed” another murder to having “been convicted of” another murder—was not error.
Hitch v. State, No. 45S03-1604-CR-167, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., April 5, 2016).
A determination that the defendant was ineligible to possess a firearm under Ind. Code 35-38-1-7.7(a) did not amount to additional punishment.