• Skip to main content
  • Skip to footer
  • Categories
    • Civil
    • Criminal
    • Juvenile
  • Courts
    • Supreme
    • Appeals
    • Tax
    • SCOTUS
    • 7th Circuit
  • Judges

Case Clips

Published by the Indiana Office of Court Services

Supreme

Camoplast Crocker, LLC v. Magic Circle Corp., No. 29S02-1407-CT-476, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., July 21, 2014).

July 24, 2014 Filed Under: Civil Tagged With: Per Curiam, Supreme

Plaintiff’s amendment of the complaint was proper when it was filed before the two-year limitation period expired, even though the court granted the motion to amend after the limitation period expired.

In re K.W., No. 49S02-1407-JT-458., __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., July 10, 2014).

July 17, 2014 Filed Under: Civil Tagged With: S. David, Supreme

The trial court abused it discretion by proceeding with a hearing and terminating parental rights in the parent’s absence when the parent was in jail.

Berry v. State, No. 49S04-1406-CR-416, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 27, 2014).

July 3, 2014 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: L. Rush, Supreme

“[W]hen a trial court accepts a plea agreement with an executed time cap, its discretion to impose further punitive conditions of probation does not extend beyond what the plea agreement specifies.”

Tin Thang v. State, No. 49S04-1402-CR-72, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 27, 2014).

July 3, 2014 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: B. Dickson, S. David, Supreme

Distinguishing caselaw holding that, for the OWI offense, endangerment cannot be inferred from intoxication alone, affirms public intoxication conviction on basis defendant’s presence while intoxicated with a car at a gas station supported an inference he operated the vehicle while intoxicated and thus committed the public intoxication element of endangering himself or others.

Gaddie v. State, No. 49S02-1312-CR-789, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 27, 2014).

July 3, 2014 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: B. Dickson, Supreme

“To avoid conflict with the Fourth Amendment . . . the statute defining the offense of Resisting Law Enforcement by fleeing after being ordered to stop must be construed to require that a law enforcement officer’s order to stop be based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Go to page 1
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Go to page 105
  • Go to page 106
  • Go to page 107
  • Go to page 108
  • Go to page 109
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Go to page 169
  • Go to Next Page »

Footer

About

Case Clips is a weekly publication of the Indiana Office of Court Services featuring appellate opinions curated by IOCS staff for Indiana judges.

Subscribe
  • Flickr
  • RSS
  • Twitter
  • YouTube

Archive

Copyright © 2025 · Indiana Office of Court Services · courts.in.gov/iocs