“[I]n addition to instructing the jury (correctly) on the elements of attempted murder under a theory of direct liability, the trial court gave an accomplice liability instruction that . . . failed to set forth that an accomplice must have the specific intent to kill when he or she knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another to attempt to commit murder”; the error was fundamental due both to the general verdict form which did not indicate whether the conviction was based on the direct attempt theory or the accomplice theory and to the State’s repeated erroneous assertions that specific intent to kill was not required for accomplice liability.
Supreme
Young v. Hood’s Gardens, Inc., No. No. 29S02-1405-PL-314, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Jan. 22, 2015).
“[T]he “value” attributable to the performance of work that triggers secondary liability under Indiana Code section 22-3-2-14(b) [Worker’s Compensation Act] includes both direct monetary payment as well as any ancillary consideration received for the work.”
Jacobs v. State, No. 49S04-1403-CR-162, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Jan. 8, 2015).
Trial judge properly excluded specific instances of conduct offered to show witness’s untruthfulness.
Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Society, Inc. v. Bridgewater, No. 93S02-1310-EX-704, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Jan. 6, 2015).
Disability discrimination claim must fail because the alleged discriminatory practice falls outside the authority of the Indiana Civil Rights Commission when it does not relate to education.
Morgan v. State, No. 49S02-1405-CR-00325, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Dec. 18, 2014).
“[W]e uphold the constitutionality of Indiana’s public intoxication statute, Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3, by reading a reasonableness standard into ‘annoys.’”