Indiana statute requires sentencing judge to advise defendant of his earliest release date and maximum possible release date, and although such failure was harmless error in this case, the facts of another case might not lead to the same harmless error result.
R. Pyle
ESPN, Inc. v. University of Notre Dame Security Police Dept., No. 71A05-1505-MI-381, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., March 15, 2016).
Private university’s police department qualified as a “public agency” under the Indiana Access to Public Records Act’s definition and so is required to provide access to its public records not exempted by the Act.
Cox v. State, No. 29A02-1508-PC-1221, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 29, 2016).
Post-conviction court was required, upon indigent prisoner’s proper request, to forward petition to the State Public Defender’s Office for review. Failure to do so required reversal.
Willie Moore v. State, No. 49A02-1505-CR-321, ___ N.E.3d ___, (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).
Illinois residential burglary statute was “substantially similar” to Indiana burglary offense; despite not expressly containing a “breaking” element, Illinois caselaw infers such a requirement, and Illinois statute classifies it as a “forcible felony.”
Evidence was insufficient to support “bodily injury” element of resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony; fact that officer was injured while chasing defendant on foot established only contributing, not proximate, causation.
Coleman v. State, No. 47A01-1506-IF-659, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2016).
Speed-limit sign facing southbound traffic, reducing speed limit from 55 to 35 mph, was ineffective against northbound motorist, despite county ordinance setting 35 mph speed limit unless otherwise designated; by state law, default speed limit for the road was 55 mph unless “appropriate signs giving notice of the altered limit are erected on the street or highway.”