Post-conviction court was required, upon indigent prisoner’s proper request, to forward petition to the State Public Defender’s Office for review. Failure to do so required reversal.
R. Pyle
Willie Moore v. State, No. 49A02-1505-CR-321, ___ N.E.3d ___, (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).
Illinois residential burglary statute was “substantially similar” to Indiana burglary offense; despite not expressly containing a “breaking” element, Illinois caselaw infers such a requirement, and Illinois statute classifies it as a “forcible felony.”
Evidence was insufficient to support “bodily injury” element of resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony; fact that officer was injured while chasing defendant on foot established only contributing, not proximate, causation.
Coleman v. State, No. 47A01-1506-IF-659, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2016).
Speed-limit sign facing southbound traffic, reducing speed limit from 55 to 35 mph, was ineffective against northbound motorist, despite county ordinance setting 35 mph speed limit unless otherwise designated; by state law, default speed limit for the road was 55 mph unless “appropriate signs giving notice of the altered limit are erected on the street or highway.”
Dull v. State, No. 68A04-1502-CR-75, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Sept. 30, 2015).
Restitution order was an abuse of discretion to the extent that it included amounts for uncharged thefts outside the timeframe covered by the indictment to which defendant pleaded guilty; defendant neither pleaded guilty to nor agreed to make restitution for any thefts outside that timeframe.
Slaybaugh v. State, No. 79A02-1411-CR-798, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Sept. 24, 2015).
Fact that juror was Facebook “friends” with relatives of the victim did not establish juror misconduct, when juror testified that she did not know them personally, and trial court found her testimony truthful.