The eggshell-skull doctrine does not apply in cases of murder or voluntary manslaughter. The relevant statutes require that the defendant either must intend to kill the victim or know that his actions will likely result in the victim’s death, which is inconsistent with the proposition that you take your victim as you find them.
N. Vaidik
D.H. v. A.C., No. 23A-JT-1369, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Dec. 21, 2023).
If a child was conceived as a result of “an act of rape,” the victim-parent can seek to terminate the rights of the perpetrator-parent. “Act of rape” is defined in statute as (1) “an act described in” the rape statute or (2) an act of child molesting (where the victim is under fourteen) involving deadly force, a deadly weapon, serious injury, or drugging.
Owens v. State, No. 23A-CR-985, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Dec. 11, 2023).
For a party to invoke T.R. 34 as the basis for an alleged discovery violation, that party must have first made a discovery request. In a criminal case, if the defendant made no discovery request to the State, the defendant cannot later challenge the admission of documents or electronically stored information on the ground that the State violated T.R. 34 in its production of the materials.
Baker v. State, No. 23A-CR-1340, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Nov. 27, 2023).
In a criminal jury trial where the State presents evidence of a greater number of separate criminal offenses than charged and does not designate the specific act or acts on which it relies for conviction, a general unanimity instruction is insufficient. The jury should be instructed that they must either unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same act or acts or that the defendant committed all the acts alleged. However, where multiple similar acts are part of one continuous episode, a special unanimity instruction is not required.
Brook v. State, No. 22A-CR-2110, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Oct. 20, 2023).
When a defendant is charged with a crime elevated based upon a prior infraction, the trial court is not required to bifurcate the proceedings. Because Lorazepam’s status as a legend drug was not an issue of fact—it was identified in court by a name specifically designated as a controlled substance by the Indiana Code—the trial court did not erroneously invade the province of the jury by giving instructions that created a mandatory presumption indicating that the substance was classified as a legend drug.