It is the defendant’s burden to timely file a T.R. 41(E) motion to dismiss before the plaintiff resumes prosecution.
E. Najam
Jackson v. State, No. 34A01-1409-CR-455, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Mar. 31, 2015).
Probation condition to report within forty-eight hours an arrest or charge for a “new criminal offense” was ambiguous as to whether it applied to an arrest or charge for an offense committed before the probationary period began; holds the ambiguity must be construed against the State, so that the reporting condition did not include arrests or charges for offenses committed before probation began.
In re J.W., Jr., No. 82A04-1408-JT-380, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., March 25, 2015).
“Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A)(iii) simply requires the DCS to demonstrate compliance with the statutory waiting period—namely, that a child has been removed from a parent for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months immediately prior to the termination hearing. That statute does not condition the waiting period on whether the DCS provided or otherwise made available any type of services to the parent.”
Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., No. 27A02-1407-CT-526, __N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., March 25, 2015).
The bar owed its patrons a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect them from foreseeable criminal attacks of third parties.
Cupello v. State, No. 49A02-1406-CR-394, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Mar. 11, 2015).
Homeowner prevailed with his “Castle Doctrine” statutory defense to a charge of battery on a law enforcement officer when the officer had unlawfully entered the home by putting his foot in the threshold of the front door.