A request for a change of judge pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. However, adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge from past proceedings with respect to a particular party are generally not sufficient reasons to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.
Appeals
Young v. State, No. 22A-CR-2923, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 14, 2023).
The testimony of a police officer, by itself, that he was acting as an agent of the property owner is insufficient to establish that the officer was in fact an agent of the owner. Therefore, a police officer who is neither an owner of a property nor an agent of an owner of a property cannot create a trespass violation by asking a patron to leave and then arrest the patron when they refuse to do so.
Nance v. State, No. 22A-CR-2581, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 3, 2023).
Opening a door to answer a knock by police, neither abandons a person’s privacy interest in their home, nor is it an invitation to the officers knocking to enter the home. Moreover, probable cause alone is not enough to justify a warrantless search of a home. It must be joined with exigent circumstances to dispense with the warrant requirement.
In re Civil Commitment of G.H., No. 23A-MH-490, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 4, 2023).
Trial court did not have the proof necessary to impose a special condition on an involuntary commitment to outpatient therapy when there was no reasonable relationship between the special condition and respondent’s treatment and safety or that of the general public.
Hochstetler v. State, No. 22A-CR-02154, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 31, 2023).
Under the intimidation statute, actual malice is based on the mindset of the defendant when the defamatory words are communicated, not their intention while contemplating the defamatory act. Inherent in actual malice is the necessity for speech to be disseminated rather than merely threatened. Moreover, criminal conduct is not protected by the church-autonomy doctrine even if carried out using communications about church doctrine or policy.