Attempted stalking, unlike the completed crime, does not require proof that the defendant’s conduct “actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.”
Appeals
Townsend v. State, No. 02A03-1503-CR-90, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2015).
Jury’s rejection of insanity defense was not contrary to law, when there was evidence that defendant’s mental state was due to voluntary intoxication rather than mental disease or defect.
Moore v. State, No. 29A02-1507-CR-866, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2015).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of failure to register as a sex offender, even though he had moved to Kentucky and was no longer an Indiana resident, because as under I.C. § 11-8-8-17(a)(5) provides, he had knowingly ceased to reside at the Indiana address he had previously registered.
Powell v. State, No. 49A02-1503-CR-135, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2015).
Trespass conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence that the defendant was still on a bar’s property at the time he was told to leave.
Berg v. State, No. 32A01-1504-CR-127, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2015).
Convictions for D-felony OWI (elevated from A-misdemeanor OWI with endangerment because of a prior OWI conviction) and B-misdemeanor reckless driving did not violate Richardson actual-evidence double jeopardy. “Evidentiary footprint” of the offenses was not identical because OWI, unlike reckless driving, required proof of intoxication. Nor did both convictions rely on “the very same behavior” because offense would have been elevated to a felony because of the prior conviction, regardless of whether it involved endangerment.