Trespass conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence that the defendant was still on a bar’s property at the time he was told to leave.
Berg v. State, No. 32A01-1504-CR-127, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2015).
Convictions for D-felony OWI (elevated from A-misdemeanor OWI with endangerment because of a prior OWI conviction) and B-misdemeanor reckless driving did not violate Richardson actual-evidence double jeopardy. “Evidentiary footprint” of the offenses was not identical because OWI, unlike reckless driving, required proof of intoxication. Nor did both convictions rely on “the very same behavior” because offense would have been elevated to a felony because of the prior conviction, regardless of whether it involved endangerment.
A.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 20A03-1502-JT-61, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Oct. 27, 2015).
The “home” that is referred to in the statute allowing for the termination of parental rights is the home of the child and not the home of a particular parent.
Carmer v. Carmer, No. 49A05-1411-DR-539, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Oct. 30, 2015).
The trial court erred when it failed to consider structured settlement payments in its calculation of gross income for the purposes of child support.
Criswell v. State, No. 02A03-1501-CR-22, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Oct. 13, 2015).
Police officer’s statement in internal-affairs investigation was inadmissible because it was given under “Garrity notice” that it “cannot be used against you in any subsequent criminal proceedings” except perjury or obstruction of justice. Statement, and its evidentiary fruits, should therefore be suppressed.