An allegedly defamatory statement related to a person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation is not defamatory per se, but the statement must impute a serious level of misconduct in a way that does not require reference to extrinsic facts for context.
Lewis v. State, No. 49A02-1504-CR-193, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
Fleeing from police by auto, then by foot, was one continuous act of fleeing and therefore, under federal double jeopardy principles, could support only one conviction for resisting law enforcement.
Abernathy v. Gulden, No. 45A03-1503-MI-73, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Nov. 30, 2015).
Ind. Code § 9-30-10-4(e), requiring the BMV to use the dates of the offenses rather than the dates of the judgments in determining a person’s status as a HTV, is a procedural amendment which does not violate the ex post facto clauses of the Indiana and United States Constitutions.
Hilligoss v. State, No. 34A02-1506-CR-529, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2015).
Failing to advise defendant of constitutional rights before accepting his admission to violating probation is a fundamental violation of due process, requiring remand for new revocation hearing. Extensions of probation for previous violations exceeded one additional year in violation of I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(2).
Causey v. State, No. 49A02-1503-CR-185, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015).
Telling police officers, “If you come any closer I’ll shoot,” was conditional and aimed at officers’ future, not past, conduct; it therefore did not threaten retaliation for their prior lawful act of responding to a domestic-disturbance report, and could not support intimidation conviction.