Defendant’s personal waiver of second-phase jury trial was required; counsel could not waive it on defendant’s behalf, even though defendant had just been through first phase of bifurcated trial.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of prior case file as evidence of defendant’s prior conviction, because file was readily and publicly available and cause number was repeatedly an unambiguously identified on the record; however, better practice would have been to formally enter the relevant documents into the record.
Criminal
Tinker v. State, No. 10A01-1507-CR-999, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., April 22, 2016).
Speedy-trial objection was not untimely; defendant had an obligation to object only if, during the 365-day period under Crim. R. 4(C), the court scheduled a new trial outside that period.
Gibson v. State, No. 22S00-1206-DP-360, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., April 12, 2016).
Allowing State to amend death-penalty charging information shortly before trial—changing the aggravator from having “committed” another murder to having “been convicted of” another murder—was not error.
Hitch v. State, No. 45S03-1604-CR-167, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., April 5, 2016).
A determination that the defendant was ineligible to possess a firearm under Ind. Code 35-38-1-7.7(a) did not amount to additional punishment.
Meunier-Short v. State, No. 32A01-1507-CR-96, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., April 14, 2016).
Trial court was not required to conduct indigency hearing before assessing fines, costs, and fees as condition of probation, but it must do so at some point before completion of probation or before revoking probation for failure to pay.
Trial court lacked authority to impose substance-abuse or drug-countermeasures fees.
Trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendant to return to school and maintain “C” average while being employed full-time; statute permits either maintaining full-time employment or “faithfully pursu[ing]” a course of study to equip him for employment.