An evidentiary harpoon occurs when the State deliberately places inadmissible evidence before the jury to prejudice the jurors against the defendant. Where an evidentiary harpoon has been introduced at trial, the reviewing court requires a high level of assurance that the irregularity did not affect the verdict before it will affirm the judgment. It is not enough that the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence; the reviewing court must be able to say with certainty that the improper testimony did not influence the verdict.
Criminal
Tyson v. State, No. 22A-PC-143, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 11, 2023).
A request for a change of judge pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. However, adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge from past proceedings with respect to a particular party are generally not sufficient reasons to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.
Young v. State, No. 22A-CR-2923, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 14, 2023).
The testimony of a police officer, by itself, that he was acting as an agent of the property owner is insufficient to establish that the officer was in fact an agent of the owner. Therefore, a police officer who is neither an owner of a property nor an agent of an owner of a property cannot create a trespass violation by asking a patron to leave and then arrest the patron when they refuse to do so.
Nance v. State, No. 22A-CR-2581, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 3, 2023).
Opening a door to answer a knock by police, neither abandons a person’s privacy interest in their home, nor is it an invitation to the officers knocking to enter the home. Moreover, probable cause alone is not enough to justify a warrantless search of a home. It must be joined with exigent circumstances to dispense with the warrant requirement.
Hochstetler v. State, No. 22A-CR-02154, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 31, 2023).
Under the intimidation statute, actual malice is based on the mindset of the defendant when the defamatory words are communicated, not their intention while contemplating the defamatory act. Inherent in actual malice is the necessity for speech to be disseminated rather than merely threatened. Moreover, criminal conduct is not protected by the church-autonomy doctrine even if carried out using communications about church doctrine or policy.