Bailey, J.
Nicholas G. Alexander appeals his convictions and sentence for three counts of contributing to delinquency, as Class A misdemeanors. He raises the following three restated issues on appeal: 1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions for contributing to delinquency, as Class A misdemeanors. 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing. 3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
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Alexander contends there was no evidence that he knew the three girls were under age eighteen when he gave them alcohol, and he maintains that such knowledge was required to convict him of the Class A misdemeanors. We disagree and conclude that knowledge of a child’s age is not required to prove a Class A misdemeanor. See I.C. § 35-46-1-8(a).
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Subsection (a) of Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-8, which is the subsection applicable to Class A misdemeanors, states in full: A person at least eighteen (18) years of age who knowingly or intentionally encourages, aids, induces, or causes a child to commit an act of delinquency (as defined by IC 31-37-1 or IC 31-37-2) commits contributing to delinquency, a Class A misdemeanor, except as provided in subsections (b) through (e).
The defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s age under this subsection is not required, and we may not add words to the statute. See, e.g., D.W., 263 N.E.3d at 157. Rather, the statute requires a defendant’s knowledge or intent to engage in the prohibited conduct of encouraging, aiding, inducing, or causing a child to commit the delinquent act of possessing or consuming alcohol. Of course, the State also must prove that the “child” to which the statute refers was under age eighteen, as that is an element of the offense, just not an element requiring a defendant’s knowledge. I.C. § 35-46-1-8; see also I.C. § 31-37-1-1 (defining delinquent child). Alexander admits the evidence showed the three girls were under age eighteen at the time he provided them with alcohol; he only claims he had no knowledge of that fact.
In contrast, subsection (c) of the statute, which applies to Level 5 felonies, does clearly require the defendant’s knowledge of the child’s age: (c) The offense described in subsection (a) is a Level 5 felony if: (1) the person committing the offense is at least twenty-one (21) years of age and knowingly or intentionally furnishes: (A) an alcoholic beverage to a child in violation of IC 7.15-7-8 when the person committing the offense knew or reasonably should have known that the person furnished the alcoholic beverage was a child[…] and (2) the consumption, ingestion, or use of the alcoholic beverage … is the proximate cause of the death of any person. I.C. § 35-46-1-8(c) (emphasis added).
If subsection (a), which is subsumed within subsection (c), required knowledge of the child’s age, there would be no need to repeat that specification in subsection (c)(1)(A); that is, the specific mens rea language in subsection (c)(1)(A) would be superfluous. But we may not presume the legislature intended to create duplicative and superfluous language in a statute. See Duke Energy, 248 N.E.3d at 1213. Moreover, subsection (c) makes it clear that the legislature knows how to specify that knowledge of age is required when that is what it intends.
Construing subsections (a) and (c) harmoniously, as we must, it is clear that the legislature intended that contributing to delinquency as a Class A misdemeanor does not require the defendant’s knowledge of the child’s age, but the greater offense of contributing to delinquency as a Level 5 felony does require such knowledge. That is, the statute requires proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the child’s age only when the charge of contributing to delinquency is brought as a Level 5 felony. I.C. § 35-46-1-8(c)(1)(A).
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In short, the statute as a whole shows a legislative intent to impose strict liability on those who provide alcohol to minors (i.e., subsection (a)) and to impose an even greater penalty on those who are aware of the age of the minor (subsection (c)), furnish the alcohol anyway, and the minor’s alcohol use proximately causes the death of any person. That is, taken together, subsections (a) and (c) of the statute evince a legislative determination that providing alcohol to minors is a harm so great that it must be punished regardless of the defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s age and that providing alcohol to one who the defendant knows is a minor is an even greater harm that should be punished even more severely when it results in someone’s death.
The crime of contributing to delinquency as a Class A misdemeanor does not require a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Alexander’s three challenged Class A misdemeanor convictions.
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Alexander further contends that the trial court abused its discretion by relying upon an aggravator that is allegedly improper as a matter of law. However, we need not address that contention because, “[w]hen we can identify sufficient aggravating circumstances to persuade us that the trial court would have entered the same sentence even without the impermissible factor, we will affirm the trial court’s decision.” Carter v. State, 271 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citation modified), trans. denied; accord Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Such is the case here; Alexander’s lack of remorse, alone, supports maximum and consecutive sentences, not to mention his pending criminal charges. See Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869. Therefore, we are confident that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of any allegedly improper aggravator. See Carter, 271 N.E.3d at 570. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed maximum and consecutive sentences.
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In short, Alexander has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the offenses and his character.
There was sufficient evidence to support Alexander’s convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him. In addition, Alexander has failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his offenses and his character. Therefore, we affirm his convictions and sentence.
Brown, J., concurs.
Weissmann, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Weissmann, J., dissenting.
Alexander gave alcohol to three teenage girls—S.C., E.B., and E.H.—all of whom were, in fact, under 18. The State proved that much, and on that point I agree with the majority. But the State never proved the one fact that actually makes this a crime: that Alexander knew the girls were minors. Because that proof is lacking, I would reverse his three convictions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor (CDM).
Indiana law already answers whether that knowledge was required. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d) (Culpability Statute) specifies that “[u]nless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is required with respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct” (emphasis added). This rule requires proof that Alexander acted knowingly or intentionally as to every material element of contributing to the delinquency of a child because nothing in the statute defining the offense “provides otherwise.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2022) (CDM Statute); Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d).
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In essence, the majority is placing a square peg in a round hole and pronouncing that it fits. I would reverse Alexander’s convictions because the State failed in its burden of proving that he knew the child was a minor, leaving insufficient evidence for conviction.
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The majority agrees, at least implicitly, that “knowingly or intentionally” governs the verbs “encourage[s], aid[s], induc[es], or caus[es]” in the CDM Statute. Op. at ¶ 14. The majority’s position is that this mens rea requirement silently stops short of the object of those verbs—“a child”—although nothing in the sentence marks that boundary. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2022).
But “knowingly or intentionally encourages, aids, induces, or causes a child to commit an act of delinquency” is a single verb phrase with a single direct object. Id. One cannot knowingly induce “a child” to do anything without some awareness that the person induced is a child. The object of the verb therefore is part of the conduct that must be done knowingly. The Legislature’s placement of “knowingly or intentionally” at the very outset of that CDM clause is exactly what triggers the Culpability Statute’s default rule and not its exception. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2022).
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The child’s age is not a footnote to this offense; it is the reason the offense exists. Giving vodka to an adult is not a crime. Giving that same vodka to a child is a crime. The only thing separating innocent conduct from a crime is what the defendant knew about who was accepting the alcohol. A statute that says “knowingly or intentionally” at the start means knowingly or intentionally as to all material elements of the prohibited conduct. Our own precedent has said so for nearly 60 years, and nothing in the felony subsection of the CDM Statute suggests otherwise. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse Alexander’s convictions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.