Mathias, J.
During a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Demontre Lamont Boyd, a canine officer jumped into Boyd’s vehicle and alerted to the presence of narcotics. Because of that alert, law enforcement officers determined they had probable cause to search the vehicle. The officers found marijuana and cocaine in the vehicle and the State subsequently charged Boyd with Level 6 felony possession of cocaine and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
Boyd filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the vehicle search, which the trial court denied. The court then granted Boyd permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal of that order, which our court accepted. On appeal, Boyd asks us to determine whether the canine search violated his Fourth Amendment rights and whether the search was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Concluding that the canine search violated both the federal and state constitutions, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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The State bore the burden to prove that the officers’ entry into Boyd’s vehicle was constitutional; however, the State did not present any evidence concerning Officer Blitz’s training and/or certification. Officer Woodard testified that she is a certified canine trainer, but the only evidence concerning Officer Blitz’s training was Officer Woodard’s explanation to Boyd during the traffic stop that the canine was trained to detect the odor of certain narcotics. Given the lack of evidence concerning Officer Blitz’s training and proficiency at detecting narcotics, Officer Woodard’s understanding of Officer Blitz’s indicating-versus alerting behavior is of utmost importance to our resolution of this case.
A canine officer’s behavior necessarily requires interpretation by a trained human partner, and canine officers exhibit varying behavior depending on their training. See, e.g., McKinney v. State, 212 N.E.3d 697, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (describing the canine’s “bracketing” behavior), trans. denied. In McKinney, the canine briefly lowered his back legs but did not sit, which was typically the canine’s final alert response. Id. The canine’s handler believed that the canine did not sit on the roadway because it was covered in “slush.” Id. Because the officer’s testimony established that she was trained to determine, based on the canine’s behavior, when the canine had detected the odor of drugs, the fact that the canine “did not fully sit down as his final response [wa]s not dispositive.” Id. See also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (observing that “drug-detection dogs are highly trained tools of law enforcement, geared to respond in distinctive ways to specific scents so as to convey clear and reliable information to their human partners”).
Here, Officer Woodard described Officer Blitz’s behavior while conducting the free air sniff outside of his vehicle as “indicating” the presence of the odor of narcotics, but the canine did not “alert” to the presence of narcotics until the canine was allowed inside the vehicle.
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Citing the “instinctive entry” rule, the State claims that “[e]ven if Officer Blitz had not indicated on the car’s exterior, . . . his entry into the car would not have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Appellee’s Br. at 16. The instinctive entry rule originated in United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 360-62 (10th Cir. 1989). In that case, law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion that the defendant driver possessed narcotics. During the traffic stop, the canine on the scene “showed interest underneath the rear area of the car and at the passenger door, and then jumped in the open hatchback where [it] ‘keyed’ on a duffle bag . . . .” Id. at 361. The trained handler let the canine “go where [its] nose would take [it].” Id. When law enforcement officers searched the duffle bag, they found narcotics. The Tenth Circuit held that the canine’s “instinctive actions” did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the officers, who had reasonable suspicion to believe that the automobile contained narcotics, did not facilitate the canine’s entry into the vehicle or encourage the canine to enter the car. Id. at 363-64. In subsequent cases, some federal and state courts have held that the instinctive entry rule applies only if law enforcement officers did not assist, facilitate, or create an opportunity for the canine to enter the vehicle. See e.g., United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1329 (10th Cir. 1998).
Recently, our court considered the instinctive entry rule in Ocampo v. State, 268 N.E.3d 823, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). In Ocampo, officers were watching for Ocampo’s vehicle, because the vehicle was the subject of a drug investigation. 268 N.E.3d at 827. The officers observed the driver of the vehicle commit driving infractions and initiated a traffic stop. The officers removed Ocampo and his passenger from the vehicle. Neither the passenger nor the officer shut the passenger door of the vehicle. Thereafter, a canine officer performed an onlead free air sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. The canine officer “did not alert for the presence of narcotics during th[at] exterior sniff.” Id.
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We agree with the Ocampo panel’s result but decline to apply the instinctive entry rule. Officer Woodard deployed her canine for the purpose of obtaining information and allowed the canine to enter Boyd’s protected private space. See Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 945 (Ind. 2020) (acknowledging that “Hoosiers regard vehicles as private areas not subject to random police rummaging”). Where a human law enforcement officer lacks probable cause to enter a vehicle to search, there is no reason why a canine officer should be permitted to enter a vehicle to search, whether that entry is instinctive or not. It is more than reasonable to require trained handlers to prevent canines from entering vehicles that law enforcement officers lack probable cause to search.
The record in this case establishes that before Officer Blitz conducted the free air sniff, Officer Woodard wanted to make it possible for Blitz to enter Boyd’s vehicle. The officer told Officer Forman to leave the driver’s side door of Boyd’s car open if Boyd did not shut it. Officer Forman’s body camera video shows that he opened the car door for Boyd, kept his hand on the door frame, and used his position adjacent to the door and in front of Boyd to make it difficult for Boyd to close the door. See State’s Ex. D. We cannot conclude that a reasonable person in Boyd’s position would have believed that he had the legal right or the officer’s permission to shut the car door. The door was left open as Officer Woodard had directed. During the free air sniff, Officer Woodard did not make any attempt to prevent Officer Blitz from entering Boyd’s vehicle.
We agree with Boyd that “[i]t defies credulity to suggest that Detective Woodard did not manipulate circumstances to be sure that her canine could jump into Boyd’s car and conduct a sniff test by directing officers to leave open Boyd’s door.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. Therefore, even if we adopted the Ocampo panel’s instinctive entry rule, because the officers manipulated Boyd into leaving the driver’s side door open, Officer Blitz’s entry into Boyd’s vehicle constituted an improper search.
For all of these reasons, we agree with Boyd that the warrantless vehicle search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
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Officer Ash stopped Boyd for a minor traffic infraction that is common driver behavior. The officer had no reason to suspect that Boyd was impaired or had contraband in his vehicle before he requested a canine officer. Officer Blitz’s entry into Boyd’s vehicle after the officers facilitated his entry by impairing Boyd’s ability to shut his car door was a significant degree of intrusion. We acknowledge a law enforcement officer’s high degree of need to investigate drug activity, but this factor is not outcome determinative where the officer has no reason to suspect drug activity after the initial traffic stop and before manipulation of the scene to facilitate entry into the vehicle by a canine officer. Under the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the officers’ search of Boyd’s vehicle was unreasonable, and therefore, violated Article 1, Section 11.
We hold, under these unique facts and circumstances, that the warrantless search of Boyd’s vehicle was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution and under Indiana Constitution. We therefore instruct the trial court to issue an order granting Boyd’s motion to suppress. See Ocampo, 268 N.E.3d at 835.
We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
May, J., and Felix, J., concur.