Tavitas, C.J.
In this consolidated appeal, Steven Watters appeals both the revocation of his probation and the denial of his motion to set aside a guilty plea regarding new charges that were filed. Watters argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, unequivocally, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in the proceedings. We reverse and remand.
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Watters argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, unequivocally, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in the probation revocation proceedings. “Probation revocation implicates a defendant’s liberty interest, which entitles him to some procedural due process.”
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There is no particular formula or script that must be read to the defendant. The information that must be given ‘will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant’s education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding…. Factors to consider include: “(1) the extent of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se.” Id. (applying these factors to determine whether a defendant validly waived his right to counsel in a guilty plea). We view these factors by considering the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 623.
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Here, there is no evidence in the record that indicates that Watters understood the dangers of self-representation and knowingly, intelligently, unequivocally, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The trial court here merely asked if Watters wanted counsel. The trial court gave no cautionary statements to Watters regarding the perils of self-representation.
The State argues that when Watters pleaded guilty in CM-633, Watters signed a rights advisement that informed him of the consequences of proceeding pro se. We find this insufficient to warn Watters of the pitfalls of self-representation.
That acknowledgement was signed over a month before the initial hearing concerning the State’s revocation petition; was labeled as an acknowledgement of rights for a misdemeanor initial hearing, which a layman may not have understood to continually apply even in later probation revocation hearings; and the trial court should have inquired with Watters about the possible negative consequences of self-representation to confirm Watters’ understanding. We also will not assume that the trial court’s off-the-record advisements properly advised Watters of the possible negative consequences of proceeding pro se.
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Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that Watters did not knowingly, intelligently, unequivocally, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the probation revocation in CM-633 and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Watters also argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, unequivocally, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in the guilty plea proceedings.
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Watters’ post-sentencing motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw the guilty plea is governed by Indiana’s Post-Conviction Rules, but the trial court did not follow the Post-Conviction Rules in deciding Watters’s motion or make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on this motion. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to comply with Indiana Code Section 35-35-1-4(c) and the Post-Conviction Rules. See, e.g., Kinman v. State, 152 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind. 2020) (holding that the post-sentencing motion was governed by the Post-Conviction Rules and the trial court’s order failed to include the required findings of fact and conclusions of law).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Watters did not knowingly, intelligently, unequivocally, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in the probation revocation proceedings, and the trial court’s order denying Watters’ motion to vacate his guilty plea was procedurally insufficient. We, accordingly, reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, J., concurs.
Felix, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
Felix, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to Part II and respectfully dissent as to Part I. I agree with the majority’s decision to sua sponte treat Watters’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief regarding his guilty plea claim, as required by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(c).10 I disagree with the majority’s choice to not likewise sua sponte treat Watters’s motion as a petition for post-conviction relief regarding his probation violation admission claim.
When a defendant pleads guilty, he cannot challenge his conviction via a direct appeal but must instead do so through a petition for post-conviction relief. Monroe v. State, — N.E.3d –, 2026 WL 1862497, at *1 (Ind. 2026) (citing Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395–96 (Ind. 1996)); see also Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(c). The same is true when a defendant admits to a probation violation and later challenges that admission. Kirkland v. State, 176 N.E.3d 986, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Huffman v. State, 822 N.E.2d 656, 658–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)); cf. J.W. v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1204 (Ind. 2019) (holding juveniles may not challenge the validity of delinquency adjudication admissions on direct appeal).
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The trial court here did not hold a hearing on Watters’s motion to set aside in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(5).11 The State did not file a substantive response to Watters’s motion, see Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(a), so the trial court should not have denied that motion without further proceedings, see id. 1(4)(f). Nor is there any indication that the parties engaged in any discovery regarding Watters’s motion such that a motion for summary disposition could have been filed. See id. 1(4)(g). Because the Post-Conviction Rules were not followed for both the guilty plea claim and the probation violation admission claim, I would reverse the denial of Watters’s motion to set aside without reaching the merits of any part thereof and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion on the entire motion.