Molter, J.
Aiming to deter police misconduct and preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings, the “exclusionary rule” requires courts to exclude evidence from trial that police obtain by violating a defendant’s constitutional rights. When a defendant invokes the rule, the State bears the burden to show constitutional compliance. The question here is whether a court must suppress evidence when the State proves constitutional compliance only at a pretrial suppression hearing and not again at trial.
We hold that constitutionally obtained evidence should not be suppressed in those circumstances because suppression would not advance the rule’s aims. Requiring the State to prove constitutional compliance twice doesn’t better deter misconduct or preserve integrity than making the State prove compliance once. Still, after a trial court denies a pretrial motion to suppress based on the conclusion that police didn’t violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, the defendant may ask the court to reconsider its ruling at trial. At that point, the court may consider both suppression hearing evidence and trial evidence. And then on appeal, the reviewing court likewise may consider evidence from both the suppression hearing and trial when evaluating constitutional compliance.
In this case, the State demonstrated at a pretrial suppression hearing that the evidence it would later use to convict Facundo Ramos-Osario of driving while intoxicated was obtained in compliance with our state and federal constitutions. We therefore affirm the judgment even though the officer who had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop testified only at the suppression hearing and not again at trial.
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Ramos-Osario argues his stop violated both the state and federal constitutions and that, when assessing the stop’s constitutionality, both the trial and appellate courts are limited to considering the trial evidence, not the evidence from the suppression hearing. Below we first explain why the stop was constitutional, and then we explain why we consider evidence from both the suppression hearing and trial when reaching that conclusion.
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Considering the first factor, Officer Solares testified at the suppression hearing that he heard gunshots and saw muzzle flashes coming from the truck Ramos-Osario was driving. That testimony reflects a high degree of suspicion and concern that the occupants of the truck were engaged in serious criminal activity. For the second factor, the stop was moderately intrusive. While routine traffic stops typically only amount “to a small intrusion” on a defendant’s ordinary activities, Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262, this stop exceeded a routine stop because the occupants were immediately removed from the truck, handcuffed, and questioned, see Alexander-Woods v. State, 163 N.E.3d 902, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (concluding the degree of intrusion was moderate where an officer ordered the occupants out of the vehicle and conducted a search of the interior), disapproved of on other grounds in Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231 (Ind. 2021). And for the third factor, Ramos-Osario concedes law enforcement’s interest and needs in investigating shots fired and preventing gun-related crime are high. Thus, on balance, the stop was reasonable and did not violate Article 1, Section 11.
We reach the same conclusion under the Fourth Amendment, which we analyze separately. State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2008). The Fourth Amendment permits officers to “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 367 (Ind. 2014) (quotations omitted). Reasonable suspicion exists if the stopping officer can “articulate some facts that provide a particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity has occurred. Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1259. Again, Officer Solares testified that he heard gunshots that sounded closest to him as Ramos-Osario’s truck, the only vehicle on the road, passed by. And he saw muzzle flashes coming from that truck. Therefore, Officer Solares had reasonable suspicion to stop Ramos-Osario’s truck.
Looking at the whole record, there is no good reason to doubt the constitutionality of the traffic stop.
Ramos-Osario argues the scope of the record we can consider in assessing the constitutional question is more limited; he believes the trial and appellate courts can consider only the trial evidence in determining whether the stop was constitutional. In Ramos-Osario’s view, because the State failed to present Officer Solares’s testimony at trial, it failed to prove the constitutionality of the stop at trial, so all the resulting evidence should have been suppressed. The State disagrees, arguing it was not required to present Officer Solares’s testimony again at trial and that courts can look back to suppression hearing evidence. We agree with the State.
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Accordingly, consistent with Magley, we hold that the State does not have to demonstrate constitutional compliance a second time at trial and that, when determining whether challenged evidence is admissible at trial, the trial judge can consider evidence from both the suppression hearing and trial.
In reaching this holding, we join jurisdictions across the country that consider suppression hearing evidence in assessing the admissibility of challenged evidence at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 958 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2020) (“When a defendant chooses to renew a suppression motion at or after trial, a district court is free to incorporate its past reasoning . . . or alternatively to consider evidence introduced at trial.”); United States v. Willis, 826 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining a district court “may consider trial testimony,” in addition to suppression hearing evidence, “if the defendant renews the suppression motion at trial” (quotations omitted)); DeMichel, 277 A.2d at 162 (suggesting courts can consider suppression hearing and trial evidence if the defendant reraises a suppression issue at trial); State v. Finster, 963 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a court “may base its decision on evidence heard at the suppression hearing, evidence received at trial, or both”).
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Under Magley, the trial judge could have summarily overruled Ramos-Osario’s trial objections. Instead, she decided to reconsider the suppression issue. Although she was entitled to consider suppression hearing evidence, she did not do so. After all, she was not the judge who conducted the suppression hearing, and the parties did not make her aware of the pretrial ruling or the suppression hearing evidence. For that reason, Ramos-Osario contends this Court’s review is limited to the evidence the trial judge considered—the trial evidence.
He is mistaken. We review de novo the question of whether the stop was constitutional, and we can affirm the trial court’s ruling on any basis in the record. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 189, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021). We are not limited to what the trial judge actually considered. Instead, when reviewing suppression issues, appellate courts, like trial courts, can consider evidence from both the suppression hearing and trial.
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The dissenting opinion takes issue with this, believing this Court’s review is limited to the trial evidence because “a reviewing court may evaluate a trial judge’s evidentiary ruling only on the evidence properly before the judge at the time of the ruling.” Post, at 5. But the trial judge’s ruling here implicates the exclusionary rule, which is a “judicially-created remedy” calculated to deter police misconduct, not a rule in our Rules of Evidence. Wright, 108 N.E.3d at 314. This is not, as the dissenting opinion suggests, like summary judgment or the sufficiency of evidence for a conviction, which are decisions on the merits of the claims. Post, at 2. By design, “the prophylactic exclusionary rule” has nothing to do with the merits and is instead a “deterrent sanction.” Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. 140, 154 (2022) (quotations omitted). Exclusion “exacts a heavy societal cost,” so the rule should be enforced only where it meaningfully advances its deterrence purpose. Wright, 108 N.E.3d at 316. And this purpose is not furthered by suppressing evidence that was, considering the whole record, constitutionally obtained solely because the State failed to prove constitutional compliance a second time at trial.
So here, when assessing the constitutionality of Ramos-Osario’s stop, we consider Officer Solares’s suppression hearing testimony, alongside the trial evidence. And as we have explained, this record makes clear that the stop did not violate the state or federal constitution. As Ramos-Osario raises no other issues, including that he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we affirm his conviction.
For these reasons, we affirm.
Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Rush, C.J., dissents with separate opinion, in which Goff, J., joins.
Rush, C.J., dissenting.
I would have denied transfer and left undisturbed the Court of Appeals’ well-reasoned, unanimous opinion. Transfer having been granted, I would adopt the panel’s approach and reverse because the State failed to establish at trial that police had reasonable suspicion to stop Facundo Ramos-Osario’s truck.
The Court, however, reaches a different result by treating the suppression-hearing transcript and the trial evidence as one undifferentiated record. I agree that, in general, “there is nothing exceptional about this conclusion.” Ante, at 8. But it is exceptional here because of the convergence of three circumstances: the judge who presided over the bench trial was not the same judge who presided over the suppression hearing; Officer Solares’s suppression-hearing testimony was not incorporated into evidence at the bench trial; and that testimony, which the suppression-hearing judge relied on to find reasonable suspicion, was never presented to the trial judge.
Ultimately, the Court’s holding expands appellate review beyond its proper bounds and weakens procedural protections that ensure constitutional questions embedded in evidentiary rulings are decided on the evidence properly before the trial judge. I therefore respectfully dissent.
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But a trial judge cannot consider suppression-hearing evidence that is never brought to their attention. Often, the same judge presides over both the suppression hearing and the trial and is therefore familiar with any uncontradicted evidence presented at the hearing. See, e.g., Guilmette, 14 N.E.3d at 40 n.1. But not always. If a different judge presides at trial, the parties should inform that judge that the suppression issue “ha[s] been heard and determined.” Magley v. State, 335 N.E.2d 811, 822 (Ind. 1975), overruled on other grounds by, Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind. 1997). Problems arise, however, when neither party alerts the new judge to the prior hearing or moves to incorporate the hearing evidence into the trial record. In those circumstances, the suppression-hearing evidence and ruling are not “before the court” when it rules on admissibility because the trial judge has no basis to know they exist. And so, when reviewing such a ruling, we should not consider uncontradicted suppression-hearing evidence because abuse-of-discretion review is confined to the facts and circumstances before the judge who made the ruling.
These rules are not mere formalism. They preserve the trial judge’s role and give meaning to the contemporaneous-objection requirement. A pretrial motion to suppress does not preserve the issue for appeal; the defendant must object when the evidence is offered at trial. Ind. Crim. Rule 2.7(B). This contemporaneous-objection requirement gives the trial judge “the opportunity to make a final ruling on the matter in the context in which the evidence is introduced.” Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2000). And it reflects “the nature of a motion to suppress,” which “is not intended to serve as the final expression concerning admissibility.” Gajdos v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (Ind. 1984). Indeed, we have expressly rejected the argument that a pretrial suppression ruling remains “effective and unchanged throughout the trial.” Id.
The Court’s holding unsettles these foundational procedural principles. If appellate courts may automatically combine suppression-hearing testimony with trial evidence whenever the embedded question is constitutional, then a renewed trial objection does little work. Going forward, the State can fail to lay the necessary foundation at trial, the trial judge can admit the evidence without that foundation, and the appellate court can cure the defect by crediting testimony from an earlier proceeding that was never presented to the trial judge. That is not review of a trial ruling; it is appellate reconstruction.
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In short, the trial judge was never presented with any suppression hearing evidence, either directly or by incorporation. We therefore cannot assess whether the judge abused her discretion by relying on facts that were never properly before her. The correct inquiry, then, is whether the State established the constitutionality of the traffic stop using only the foundational evidence presented at the bench trial. It did not.
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Because the State failed to establish the stop’s constitutionality at trial, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained from the stop. And because that evidence was the only evidence supporting Ramos-Osario’s conviction, I would reverse.
I acknowledge that reversal may seem unwarranted in light of Officer Solares’s suppression-hearing testimony. But procedural protections matter most when they affect outcomes. The State bears the burden to establish the constitutional foundation for an investigatory stop. And an appellate court must review trial rulings based on the evidence properly before the trial judge when those rulings were made. Because the Court’s decision departs from both principles, I respectfully dissent.
Goff, J., joins.