Rush, C.J.
Correctional institutions face persistent challenges in ensuring the safety of both inmates and staff, particularly when dangerous materials infiltrate their facilities. Our Legislature has therefore criminalized the possession of such materials by incarcerated individuals. But, as with any crime, liability attaches only if an inmate voluntarily engages in the prohibited conduct. This case requires us to reconcile that requirement with the restricted freedom detention necessarily entails.
Here, after a defendant’s arrest and placement in a jail cell, he realized he had a small canister of pepper spray in his pocket. Although he ultimately alerted officers to its presence, he did not comply with their initial efforts to retrieve it. As a result, the State charged him under a statute prohibiting incarcerated individuals from possessing material capable of causing bodily injury, and a jury found him guilty. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, asserting that he did not knowingly possess the pepper spray in jail because his entry into the facility—and thus his continued possession there—was not voluntary.
We disagree. Under the relevant statute, even if an arrestee involuntarily brings prohibited material into a penal facility, the failure to relinquish it at the earliest reasonable opportunity is a voluntary act that may subject them to criminal liability. Because the State presented sufficient evidence that the defendant failed to do so here, we affirm his conviction.
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A cornerstone of our criminal justice system is that culpability requires a voluntary act, not mere status or circumstance. See Ind. Code § 35-41-21(a). And so, when the evidence places voluntariness in dispute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted voluntarily. Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1176 (Ind. 1992). This issue frequently arises in cases involving crimes that require knowing or intentional possession. The offense here, for example, prohibits a person “incarcerated in a penal facility” from “knowingly or intentionally” possessing “a device, equipment, a chemical substance, or other material that . . . is used[] or . . . intended to be used[] in a manner that is readily capable of causing bodily injury.” I.C. § 35-44.1-3-7. But when charged with such an offense, a defendant may assert as a defense that their possession was involuntary because they weren’t aware of the possession for enough time to terminate it. I.C. § 35-41-2-1(b). These principles guide our resolution of this appeal.
Although Gary challenges the knowing-possession element of his conviction, his sole argument is that the State failed to prove he “voluntarily engaged in the conduct of possessing a dangerous device while in a penal facility.” The State counters that, even if Gary didn’t voluntarily bring the pepper spray into the jail, the evidence shows he voluntarily retained possession of it after having opportunities to surrender it.
We agree with the State. The statute under which Gary was charged— Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-7—prohibits an incarcerated person from retaining possession of prohibited material inside a penal facility, even if they didn’t bring it into the facility voluntarily. And because the State presented sufficient evidence that Gary failed to relinquish the pepper spray at the earliest reasonable opportunity, we affirm his conviction.
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The plain language of Section 35-44.1-3-7 criminalizes the knowing or intentional possession, by a person incarcerated in a penal facility, of contraband that is used or intended to be used in a manner capable of causing bodily injury.
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Yet Gary is correct in noting that “[t]he accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to purge” themselves “of the prohibited items.” Indeed, when possession is an element of a crime, “it is a defense that the person who possessed the property was not aware of his possession for a time sufficient for him to have terminated his possession.” I.C. § 35-41-21(b). So, a defendant does not violate Section 35-44.1-3-7 if they relinquish a prohibited item at the earliest reasonable opportunity after discovering it. Denying such an opportunity would create perverse incentives. A person who discovers contraband only after entering a penal facility would be encouraged to conceal it for fear of punishment, thereby undermining the statute’s goal of maintaining institutional safety. And while a correctional officer should warn arrestees upon intake about the consequences of retaining prohibited items and request disclosure of any contraband, see Baker, 208 N.E.3d at 641, this opportunity need not be provided at the jailhouse door. What matters is that, once an arrestee becomes aware of the contraband, they must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to surrender it without penalty. But if the arrestee declines that opportunity, continued possession becomes voluntary.
Having explained why Section 35-44.1-3-7 prohibits an incarcerated individual from retaining possession of material that can cause bodily injury once they become aware of it and receive a reasonable opportunity to relinquish it, we now turn to whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Gary’s conviction.
Recall that Gary asserts the State failed to prove he voluntarily brought the pepper spray into the penal facility. But, as explained above, Section 35-44.1-3-7 prohibits an incarcerated person from retaining possession of a prohibited item regardless of how it entered the facility. The question, then, is whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Gary failed to relinquish the pepper spray at the earliest reasonable opportunity. Based on our review of the evidence favorable to the verdict, we conclude that it did.
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Indeed, the only factual dispute is whether Gary meant to discharge the pepper spray or accidentally set it off while trying to pass it under the door. But the evidence favorable to the verdict shows that the gap under his cell door was only “about the width of a pencil,” leaving no “conceivable way” for the canister to pass through. A reasonable jury could therefore conclude that Gary wasn’t attempting to turn it in.
In sum, the evidence supports the conclusion that Gary failed to relinquish the pepper spray when he was given reasonable opportunities to do so. Concluding otherwise would require us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
For the reasons articulated above, we affirm Gary’s conviction.
Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.