Mathias, J.
Roger Rodriguez, Jr. appeals his convictions for murder and Level 3 felony robbery. Rodriguez raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows: 1. Whether Rodriguez waived appellate review of the admission of certain evidence when, despite an appropriate and prior objection, he later informed the court that he had no objection to that evidence. 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury on self-defense.
We clarify that, under the current version of Indiana Evidence Rule 103, a defendant preserves a continuing objection to the admission of evidence for appellate review simply by making a timely objection to that evidence during trial, identifying the specific ground for the objection, and receiving the trial court’s definitive ruling on the objection on the record at trial. There is no magic language required under Evidence Rule 103 to preserve appellate review over an objection, even a continuing objection, that otherwise hits those marks. However, our case law has long made clear that, despite a prior, preserved objection, a defendant waives appellate review of the admission of evidence if he later informs the court that he has no objection to that same evidence. That is what happened here, so Rodriguez’s evidentiary challenge on appeal is waived. As for the jury instructions, the trial court did not err.
We affirm.
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On appeal, we first address Rodriguez’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of the video-recording evidence that shows him removing the tote and rifle from Kates’s car after the shooting. The State argues that Rodriguez’s appeal has not been preserved for our review both because Rodriguez did not follow the proper procedure for preserving a continuing objection and also because he told the court, later at trial, that he had no objection to the video recording.
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However, there has been a split in our Court regarding whether such magic language survived an amendment to Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b), which had an effective date of January 1, 2014. Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b) simply states: “Once the court rules definitively on the record at trial a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” At least two panels of our Court, citing Rule 103(b), have concluded that a claim of error in the admission of evidence is preserved for appellate review under Rule 103(b) by simply “renewing” a pretrial motion to suppress at trial and having the court definitely state that it is “denying” that objection. K.G. v. State, 81 N.E.3d 1078, 1080 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 103(b)); see also Bailey v. State, 131 N.E.3d 665, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that a claim of error in the admission of evidence was preserved for appellate review where, after the defendant objected at trial, the trial court stated that it would treat that objection as a Rule 103(b) objection, which the court then denied), trans. denied. A third panel has concluded that Rule 103(b) required “supplement[ing]” Hayworth by noting that a request for a continuing objection “should ideally specify that it is pursuant to Evidence Rule 103(b).” Hostetler v. State, 184 N.E.3d 1240, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (emphasis added), trans. denied.
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We conclude that the language of Evidence Rule 103, especially in light of its March 6, 2026 amendment that becomes effective July 1, 2026, speaks for itself and controls. To preserve appellate review of a continuing objection to the admission of evidence at trial, the objecting party must “timely object” to the evidence, “state[] the specific ground” for the objection unless that ground is already “apparent,” and receive the trial court’s “definitive[]” ruling on the objection “on the record at trial.”5 Evid. R. 103(a), (b). The Rule does not require the objecting party to specifically identify his or her objection to the admission of evidence as a “continuing” one, and it says nothing about requiring the trial court to specifically identify the objection as a “continuing” one. See id.
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As for the State’s second theory of waiver, our case law is unambiguous. On this point, the Hostetler panel made clear that other language from Hayworth survived the amendment to Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b): . . .
The [Evidence Rule 103(b)] amendment did not change or overrule the existing case law explaining that a defendant can waive a continuing objection by affirmatively stating that he has no objection when evidence is introduced and admitted at trial. We take this opportunity to echo and supplement the Hayworth Court’s clarification regarding the “proper procedure” for a defendant who seeks to rely upon a continuing objection, which is now set forth under Evidence Rule 103(b). Upon a defendant’s “timely” and “sufficiently specific objection to a particular class of evidence” at trial, the defendant’s request for a continuing objection should ideally specify that it is pursuant to Evidence Rule 103(b). . . .Thereafter, “during the subsequent admission of that class of evidence” to which the defendant sought the continuing objection under Evidence Rule 103(b), the “proper procedure” is for the defendant to “remain silent[.]” Hayworth, 904 N.E.2d at 686, 694. If the defendant were to make a statement to the admission of the evidence, especially where a trial court asks if the defendant has any objection, the recommended procedure would be for the defendant to simply state that he is relying upon his continuing objection under Evidence Rule 103(b).
184 N.E.3d at 1246. As our Supreme Court has made clear, an “appellant cannot on the one hand state at trial that he has no objection to the admission of evidence and thereafter in this Court claim such admission to be erroneous.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 679 (Ind. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
We thus agree with the State’s second theory of waiver here. After Rodriguez had properly objected to the admission of evidence showing him removing the tote and rifle from Kates’s car after the shooting, he then affirmatively told the trial court that he had “[n]o objection” to the admission of the specific video recording that showed him removing those items from Kates’s car.
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Rodriguez does not dispute that the language added by the court to his proffered jury instruction, regarding both the subjective and objective standards for self-defense, was correct as a matter of law. See id. at 349. Rather, his only argument on appeal is that the trial court’s addition of that language created confusing surplusage. We discern neither confusion nor surplusage in the court’s jury instruction on self-defense. We therefore reject Rodriguez’s argument.
For all of these reasons, we affirm Rodriguez’s convictions.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.