Rush, C.J.
Because trial courts regularly observe witness demeanor and assess credibility firsthand, they are best positioned to gauge the significance of the testimony and evidence before them. By contrast, reviewing courts like ours consider only the paper record. So, recognizing our limited role, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility. Nor do we require trial courts to accept a witness’s self-serving testimony even when it’s uncontradicted.
Here, an ex-husband claimed that his ex-wife’s failure to pay a joint loan—as required by their divorce settlement—damaged his credit rating, causing financial harm. During an evidentiary hearing, the ex-husband testified about his claimed damages but offered scant corroborating evidence. The trial court ultimately found the ex-wife in contempt for not paying the loan but declined to award the ex-husband damages, finding them speculative and unproven. The Court of Appeals issued an opinion partially reversing the trial court. And although that appellate opinion was not certified, the trial court issued a revised order to comply with it.
We first hold that the trial court did not clearly err in declining to award the ex-husband damages. We then hold that the trial court’s revised order is void because the court had no jurisdiction to issue it during the pendency of this appeal. We thus affirm the court’s original order and remind trial courts, administrative agencies, parties, and counsel to refrain from relying on uncertified appellate opinions.
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In November 2023, the trial court held a lengthy evidentiary hearing on multiple issues, including Steven’s contempt petition.
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A few months after the hearing, the trial court issued an order in which it found Jennifer in contempt for her “willful failure” to pay the loan. But the court did not award Steven any damages, finding that his “professed damages were based upon speculation” and there was “insufficient evidence to show a direct correlation” between the unpaid Wells Fargo loan and Steven’s credit rating.
Steven appealed, arguing only that the trial court erred in declining to award him damages. In a published opinion, a divided Court of Appeals panel partially reversed, instructing the trial court to award Steven over $14,000 and deciding other issues not raised by the parties. Norris v. Norris, 253 N.E.3d 1115, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Judge Tavitas dissented, concluding that the majority had reweighed evidence. Id. at 1127‒28 (Tavitas, J., dissenting). Without waiting for certification, the trial court issued a revised order carrying out the Court of Appeals’ instructions.
Jennifer petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
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That said, a trial court commits legal error if it issues an order without jurisdiction. And, as relevant here, once an appellate court acquires jurisdiction over a case, the trial court may not revise the judgment under appeal until an appellate opinion is both issued and certified. G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 192 (Ind. 2024). Indeed, Appellate Rule 65(E) prohibits trial courts, administrative agencies, and parties from taking any action in reliance upon uncertified appellate opinions.
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Once the trial court held Jennifer in contempt, it could have ordered her to pay Steven any resulting credit-related damages under either its inherent authority or the settlement agreement. But considering the dearth of evidence to support Steven’s claimed damages, coupled with the deference we afford the trial court as factfinder, we conclude that it did not clearly err.
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After the Court of Appeals issued its published opinion that partially reversed the trial court’s judgment, Jennifer timely sought rehearing. While that request was pending, the trial court, on its own, issued a revised order to implement the Court of Appeals’ instructions. But the trial court lacked authority to issue that order because the appellate opinion was not yet certified. We thus take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of following Appellate Rule 65(E), which prohibits trial courts, administrative agencies, and parties from taking action based on published opinions or memorandum decisions (collectively “opinions”) before they are certified.
An opinion is not final so long as opportunities for further appellate review remain. When the Court of Appeals issues an opinion, the appellate clerk’s office initially serves uncertified copies on counsel, unrepresented parties, and the trial court. App. R. 65(E). Parties then have thirty days to petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals or forty-five days to seek transfer to this Court. App. R. 54(B), 57(C)(1). If rehearing is sought, transfer petitions must then be filed within thirty days after the Court of Appeals’ disposition of the rehearing petition. App. R. 57(C)(2). And if this Court grants transfer and issues an opinion, a party has thirty days to petition for rehearing. App. R. 54(B).
Because of these opportunities for appellate review, the clerk’s office will certify a Court of Appeals opinion “only after the time for all Petitions for Rehearing, Transfer, or Review has expired, unless all the parties request earlier certification.” App. R. 65(E). And if we grant transfer, the clerk’s office will not certify any opinion until we dispose of the appeal. Id. In practice, certification occurs a few days after the window for review closes. And only after certification may a trial court, administrative agency, or party “take any action in reliance upon” the opinion. Id.
This certification process prevents trial courts from interfering with the subject matter of a pending appeal. Once an appeal is filed and the trial court clerk’s record is complete, “Appellate Rule 8 divests the trial court of ‘jurisdiction to act upon the judgment appealed from until the appeal has been terminated.’” Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners Ass’n, Inc., 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1005 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Schumacher v. Radiomaha, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. 1993)). And thus, before certification, a trial court’s order is void and a nullity if it interferes with the appeal’s subject matter. G.W., 231 N.E.3d at 192. Only upon certification does jurisdiction over that subject matter return to the trial court. Id.
This case illustrates the pitfalls of ignoring these rules. While the appeal was pending, the trial court revised its judgment in an order that was and remains void. Yet, relying on that order, Jennifer began making payments of $500 per month to Steven—which his law firm held in trust—to satisfy the revised judgment. The parties will now have to unwind those payments. Going forward, we urge trial courts, administrative agencies, parties, and counsel to comply with Appellate Rule 65(E) by not taking any action in reliance upon uncertified opinions.
Conclusion
The trial court did not clearly err in declining to award Steven damages for Jennifer’s contempt in its original order. But the court did err in issuing a revised order imposing sanctions pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ uncertified opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s original order.
Justices Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, concur.