Rush, C.J.
Remote court proceedings became commonplace during the COVID-19 pandemic, and that forced experiment revealed several advantages, such as increased access, efficiency, and flexibility. But when testimony is involved, remote proceedings can pose heightened risks to individual rights. With those risks in mind, Interim Administrative Rule 14(C) makes clear that no part of a testimonial proceeding can occur remotely unless the proponent shows good cause and the proceeding complies with constitutional guarantees. This case tests those limits in a criminal trial.
Here, the State asked the court to allow a witness in a murder trial to testify remotely, representing that he was incarcerated four hours away and that the county jail lacked the resources to transport him. Over the defendant’s objection, the court granted the request. The witness testified virtually and implicated the defendant in the murder. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the defendant asserted on appeal that the court erred in permitting the testimony because the State failed to show good cause.
We agree and take this opportunity to set forth the standard for good cause under Interim Rule 14(C) when the State seeks to present remote testimony in a criminal trial. In these circumstances, the State must present case-specific evidence that permitting a particular witness to testify remotely is necessary to prevent a concrete and substantial harm that would otherwise likely occur and that could not be adequately addressed if the witness were to testify in person. Because the State failed to make that showing here, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the witness to testify virtually. But because we hold the error was harmless, we affirm.
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Over the past five years, courts nationwide have seen a significant increase in remote proceedings. Indiana is no different. And since January 2023, such proceedings have been governed by Interim Administrative Rule 14. That rule defines a “remote proceeding” as “any proceeding, including without limitation entire proceedings or parts of it, using telephone or videoconferencing capabilities to allow case participants to appear virtually.” Interim Admin. R. 14(A)(1). There is no question that the rise of virtual participation has enhanced access, efficiency, and flexibility for parties and lawyers alike. But not all court proceedings are the same. To that point, for testimonial proceedings—those where a trial court receives sworn oral testimony—the rule expressly acknowledges that “[p]resenting live testimony in court remains of utmost importance.” Interim Admin. R. 14 cmt.
Consistent with this recognition, Interim Rule 14 establishes a presumption that all testimonial proceedings, such as criminal trials, will be conducted in person. Interim Admin. R. 14(C). But there are exceptions. Relevant here, a court can conduct a testimonial proceeding “remotely for all or some of the case participants for good cause shown.” Id. In addition to this good-cause showing, the proceeding “must comply with constitutional and statutory guarantees.” Id.
In the civil context, we have explained that the good-cause showing requires “particularized and specific factual support.” B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 364. But we have not decided whether this same standard applies in criminal cases—particularly when, as here, the State asks a court to permit a witness to testify virtually.
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We agree with the State that Shabazz waived his constitutional challenges. He failed to explain how the trial court deprived him of his confrontation rights, to develop an argument under either constitutional provision, or to analyze authority in support of these challenges… But we agree with Shabazz that the State failed to show the requisite good cause. In reaching this decision, we conclude Interim Rule 14(C) requires a heightened good-cause showing—informed by, but separate from, a defendant’s constitutional rights to confront witnesses—when the State seeks to have a witness testify remotely in a criminal trial. And because the State failed to make that showing here, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Jones to testify virtually. But because we hold that the error was harmless, we affirm.
We first address the standard governing how the State shows “good cause” for a trial court to permit a witness to testify remotely against a criminal defendant at trial under Interim Rule 14(C). Because the rule authorizes remote participation in a testimonial proceeding only if it complies with constitutional guarantees, the good-cause showing in a criminal case is necessarily shaped by a defendant’s constitutional rights. And because both the Indiana and federal constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to confront adverse witnesses face to face, those rights inform the meaning of “good cause” in this context. But we address only how a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights bear on Interim Rule
14(C). We do not conduct a constitutional analysis here, as this appeal does not present a preserved constitutional challenge.
Ultimately, we conclude that to show good cause under Interim Rule 14(C) for remote testimony in a criminal trial, the State must present case-specific evidence that allowing a particular witness to testify remotely is necessary to prevent a concrete and substantial harm that would otherwise likely occur and that could not be adequately addressed if the witness were to testify in person. Applying that standard here, we hold that the State failed to make the required showing, and thus the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Jones to testify virtually.
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All in all, the State did not carry its burden of showing good cause because it failed to present case-specific evidence that requiring Jones to testify in person would likely have caused a concrete and substantial harm and that permitting him to testify virtually was necessary to avert that harm. And because of that failure, the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Jones to testify virtually. We now turn to whether that error was harmless.
Although Interim Rule 14(C) is informed by constitutional guarantees, a violation of that rule does not automatically require review under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. That standard applies only to properly preserved constitutional claims. And here, as explained above, Shabazz waived his constitutional challenges. Accordingly, the only issue before us is the alleged misapplication of Interim Rule 14(C). And because we’ve concluded the trial court erred in applying the rule, we assess whether that error was harmless by applying Appellate Rule 66(A)’s probable impact test.
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Against this evidentiary backdrop, Jones’s testimony was, at most, cumulative. And the jury had multiple independent, corroborating bases to reasonably conclude that Shabazz was an accomplice to Tiffany’s murder. Accordingly, Shabazz has failed to show that the probable impact of the trial court’s error—considered in light of all the evidence— undermines our confidence in the verdict. The error was therefore harmless.
The State did not carry its burden of showing good cause under Interim Rule 14(C). We therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the witness to testify virtually. But because we hold that the error was harmless, we affirm.
Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.