Rush, C.J.
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause reflects the Framers’ conviction that a criminal defendant should not be found guilty based on the untested words of an absent witness. Instead, a defendant must have the opportunity to personally question a witness to probe their recollection, test their reliability, expose their bias, and draw out favorable facts through cross-examination. When a trial court denies a defendant this constitutional right, the error requires reversal unless the State proves it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Here, a defendant was charged with supplying a drug dealer with pills that tragically killed a seventeen-year-old. During a bench trial, the court admitted—over objection and without an opportunity for cross-examination—the dealer’s statement to police naming the defendant as the supplier of the fatal pills, and the defendant was found guilty. On appeal, the State concedes that the defendant’s constitutional right to confront the dealer was violated. And because the State has not shown that the error in admitting the inculpatory statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate the defendant’s challenged conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge.
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Here, the State concedes that Engle’s statement to police identifying Taylor as the supplier of the pills that caused K.L.’s death was testimonial, that Engle was unavailable, and that Taylor had no prior opportunity to cross-examine him. But while both parties agree that admitting Engle’s statement violated Taylor’s constitutional right to confrontation, they disagree on whether reversal is required.
Constitutional errors of this kind require reversal unless “the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind. 2010). In this case, the State offered Engle’s statement through Officer Coffman to prove that Taylor knowingly aided, induced, or caused Engle to deliver the M30 pills that led to K.L.’s death. See Ind. Code §§ 35-41-2-4, -42-1-1.5(a)(1). Taylor maintains the trial court’s erroneous admission of that statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was “the sole direct evidence” tying Taylor to the fatal pills. But the State counters that this connection was established through other, properly admitted evidence.
To determine whether the State met its burden, we consider several factors: the significance of the improperly admitted evidence to the State’s case; whether that evidence was merely cumulative; whether it was corroborated or contradicted by other evidence; and the extent of cross-examination or questioning on the improperly admitted evidence. Koenig, 933 N.E.2d at 1273. Analyzing those factors here, we hold that the State has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Engle’s improperly admitted statement did not contribute to the challenged verdict.
We begin by evaluating the significance of Engle’s statement to Officer Coffman identifying Taylor as the source of the “blue pills” later sold to K.L. That statement was direct evidence of Taylor’s guilt because it was based on Engle’s “personal knowledge” and, if true, proved Taylor’s involvement “without inference or presumption.” Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 489 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Direct Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). Thus, Engle’s statement was critical to the State proving Taylor’s challenged conviction.
That statement was also far from cumulative, as it was the only direct evidence linking Taylor to the specific pills that killed K.L. The State underscored this point during closing argument, emphasizing that Engle’s statement established that Taylor supplied the fatal pills. All other evidence suggesting Taylor’s role was circumstantial—the kind of evidence “based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.” Id. (quoting same). And though such evidence can support a conviction on its own, Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022), we have long recognized the “qualitative difference between direct and circumstantial evidence with respect to the degree of reliability and certainty they provide as proof of guilt,” Hampton, 961 N.E.2d at 486.
Moreover, the circumstantial evidence did not corroborate Engle’s statement that Taylor supplied the pills that caused K.L.’s death. To be sure, the State presented evidence showing that Taylor sold M30s to Engle in the months leading up to K.L.’s death and that the two discussed a possible sale on Facebook the day before Engle sold the pills to K.L. But this evidence did not establish that a sale occurred at that time.
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What’s more, Taylor was unable to effectively challenge the reliability of Engle’s statement to Officer Coffman. Because neither Officer Coffman nor any other witness had personal knowledge of Engle’s more recent recantation naming Sheets as the supplier of the fatal pills, Taylor had no opportunity to expose the inconsistencies through cross-examination. Nor could Taylor probe Engle’s potential motive for initially identifying him as the supplier in exchange for immunity. See Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind. 1999) (discussing the importance of cross-examination for demonstrating a witness’s bias). Ultimately, Engle’s inculpatory statement was never tested—the very harm the Confrontation Clause seeks to prevent.
All in all, Engle’s improperly admitted statement identifying Taylor as the supplier of the fatal pills was vital to the State’s case, non-cumulative, uncorroborated, and untested through cross-examination. We therefore cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that Engle’s incriminating statement did not contribute to the verdict on Taylor’s challenged conviction.
Because the State has not carried its burden to show that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate Taylor’s Level 1 felony conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge.
Goff and Molter, JJ., concur.
Massa and Slaughter, JJ., dissent, believing transfer should be denied and the Court of Appeals’ decision reinstated.