Felix, J.
Statement of the Case
Despite knowing about and taking part in ongoing custody proceedings instituted by M.Q. (“Grandmother”) and her husband N.G. (“StepGrandfather”), M.W. III (“Adoptive Father”) and B.R. (“Adoptive Mother”) filed petitions to adopt Au.S. and Am.S. (collectively, the “Children”) without informing the adoption court of the pending custody matters. Nor did the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) notify the adoption court of the custody proceedings, in which it had intervened. After the adoption court granted Adoptive Mother and Father’s petitions to adopt the Children, Grandmother and Step-Grandfather (collectively, “Grandparents”) filed motions to intervene and correct error, alleging the adoptions should be set aside in light of the preexisting and still-pending custody cases. The adoption court denied both motions. Grandparents now appeal, raising two issues for our review:
1. Whether the adoption court abused its discretion by denying Grandparents’ motions to intervene; and
2. Whether the adoption court abused its discretion by denying Grandparents’ motions to correct error.
Because we determine that Grandparents should have been allowed to intervene in the adoption proceedings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 24(B)(2), we reverse and remand with instructions for the adoption court to allow Grandparents’ permissive intervention and to consider the motions to correct error. In reaching this conclusion, we hold that when a jurisdictional priority problem arises in a proceeding concerning custody of a child, that jurisdictional priority problem presumptively qualifies as a potential ground for permissive intervention under Trial Rule 24(B)(2). Under these circumstances, permissive intervention should only be denied if the trial court finds that (1) the first-to-file petitioner has relinquished their interest in pursuing custody of the child, or (2) intervention is unnecessary because the child’s placement with the second-to-file petitioner is clearly in the child’s best interests. If neither finding is supported by the record, the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary and unusual to permit intervention under Trial Rule 24(B)(2).
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Before we reach Grandparents’ arguments, we first address Adoptive Parents’ contention that Grandparents’ motions to intervene and correct error were untimely. Trial Rule 24 provides the parameters for filing a motion to intervene, and Trial Rule 59 provides the parameters for filing a motion to correct error. Trial Rule 24 does not expressly impose a deadline for filing a motion to intervene. Trial Rule 59 states that a motion to correct error “must be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the entry of a final judgment is noted in the chronological case summary.” Ind. Trial Rule 59(C); see also id. 24(C) (“Intervention after trial or after judgment for purposes of a motion under Rule[] 59 . . . may be allowed upon motion.”). Here, the Decrees of Adoption were issued and noted in the Adoption Causes’ chronological case summaries on February 26, 2025. Any motion to correct error regarding those decrees had to be filed on or before March 28, 2025. See T.R. 59(C). Grandparents filed their motions to intervene and correct error on March 27. Therefore, Grandparents’ motions to correct error, and by extension their motions to intervene, were not untimely.
1. The Adoption Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying Grandparents’ Trial Rule 24(B) Motions to Intervene
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For the reasons stated in Chief Justice Rush’s dissent from the denial of transfer in A.E., 208 N.E.3d at 601–02 (Rush, C.J., dissenting), we respectfully disagree with the A.E., 191 N.E.3d 952, decision. As noted by Chief Justice Rush, the Z.D. decision on which the A.E. decision relies does not mention Trial Rule 24(B) and it cites to authority concerning only Trial Rule 24(A), which governs intervention of right. A.E., 208 N.E.3d at 601 (citing Z.D., 878 N.E.2d at 498).
While it may be true that “noncustodial grandparents are not entitled to intervene in adoption proceedings,” id. (emphasis added) (quoting Z.D., 878 N.E.2d at 498), the plain language of Trial Rule 24(B) does not require a party seeking permissive intervention thereunder to demonstrate any cognizable right; instead, the party need only show that (1) “a statute confers a conditional right to intervene,” Ind. Trial Rule 24(B)(1), or (2) the party’s “claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common,” id. 24(B)(2). Furthermore, Trial Rule 24(B) does not require a party to establish standing in order to request permissive intervention. A.E., 208 N.E.3d at 602 (Rush, C.J., dissenting).
Here, because Grandparents stated in their Trial Rule 24(B) motion that they filed the custody petitions in another court of competent jurisdiction, they properly raised a claim or defense and a question of law in common with Adoptive Parents’ adoption action. See A.E., 208 N.E.3d at 602 (Rush, C.J., dissenting). To the extent the trial court’s citation to A.E., 191 N.E.3d 952, signified it was denying Grandparents’ motion to intervene for lack of standing, denial on that basis, we respectfully believe, was erroneous. See A.E., 208 N.E.3d at 602 (Rush, C.J., dissenting).
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Considering the jurisdictional priority rule together with the strong interest in finality for adoption decrees, we adopt Chief Justice Rush’s framework for addressing jurisdictional priority issues in cases where a party—such as a noncustodial grandparent—seeks post-judgment intervention in an already finalized adoption case pursuant to Trial Rule 24(B)(2)..
Applying this framework here demonstrates that the adoption court abused its discretion by denying Grandparents’ post-judgment motions to intervene…
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DCS’s and Adoptive Parents’ failure to notify the adoption court of the Custody Causes and their corresponding failure to notify the custody court of the Adoption Causes until after the adoptions were finalized is not only vexing, but it is also damaging to the integrity of our trial courts, to say the least.7 As the adoption court noted in this case, the Adoptive Parents’ “failure to advise this Court of the pending custody action in [the Custody Causes] undermines the public’s confidence in the judiciary and expends unnecessary judicial resources.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 7, 74, 100, 169.
…Adoptive Parents are correct that the Indiana Code did not expressly require notice to Grandparents of the Adoption Causes. But how are our trial courts to be assured that their adoption decisions are in a child’s best interests when, as here, the adoptive parents and DCS withhold crucial information, namely, the existence of other, preexisting proceedings concerning custody of the child to be adopted? We hold this information is the type of “[a]dditional information” that must be provided in an adoption petition pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-2-6(a)(9), and the Adoptive Parents had a statutory obligation to disclose the Custody Causes to the adoption court….
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When the adoption court denied Grandparents’ motions to intervene—without holding a hearing and with its only explanation being a citation to A.E., 191 N.E.3d 952—it had no basis to conclude either that (1) Grandparents relinquished their interest in pursuing custody of the Children, or (2) intervention was unnecessary because placement with Adoptive Parents was clearly in Child’s best interests. The adoption court therefore abused its discretion by denying Grandparents’ Trial Rule 24(B) motions to intervene in the Adoption Causes.
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Conclusion
In sum, the adoption court abused its discretion by denying Grandparents’ motions to intervene in the Adoption Causes, so we reverse those denials as well as the adoption court’s denials of Grandparents’ motions to correct error. We remand with instructions for the adoption court to grant Grandparents’ motions for permissive intervention and to consider Grandparents’ motions to correct error.
Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, J., concurs.
Tavitas, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Tavitas, Judge, concurring.
I fully concur in the majority opinion, but I write separately to discuss intervention as of right and emphasize that the gamesmanship demonstrated here crosses the line of zealous advocacy.
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