Rush, C.J.
In a juvenile delinquency case, the State can appeal only a limited set of orders prescribed by statute. But because that statute is framed in criminal law terms, its application to juvenile matters is uncertain. Here, the State contends the statute authorizes its appeal from a trial court’s order denying approval of a delinquency petition. We address that issue but ultimately conclude we need not resolve it. Even assuming the statute permits the appeal, the State forfeited its right by filing an untimely notice of appeal. And because the State has failed to present any extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate that right, we dismiss.
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Neither party disputes that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over B.H. and erred by concluding otherwise. See Ind. Code §§ 31-9-2-13(d)(2), 31-30-1-1(a)(1). Rather, the dispute centers on two issues: whether the State had authority to appeal the trial court’s order denying approval of the delinquency petition; and whether we should dismiss the appeal as untimely.
It is well-settled that the State needs statutory authorization to appeal criminal matters. See, e.g., State v. Brunner, 947 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ind. 2011). And this same rule applies in juvenile delinquency cases. State v. I.T., 4 N.E.3d 1139, 1142 n.1 (Ind. 2014). The State’s statutory right to appeal in juvenile delinquency cases is “governed by” Indiana Code section 35-38-42. I.C. § 31-37-13-6. That statute provides a list of five specific types of orders from which the State can appeal as a matter of right. I.C. § 35-38-42(a). And it also permits the State to appeal an interlocutory order if it is certified by the trial court and the appellate court finds one of three enumerated circumstances applies. I.C. § 35-38-4-2(b).
But even when Section 35-38-4-2 authorizes an appeal, the State must still comply with our appellate rules. This includes complying with the thirty-day time limit to file a notice of appeal when, following the entry of a final judgment, a trial court rules on a timely motion to correct error. App. R. 9(A)(1). Though missing this deadline forfeits the right to appeal, App. R. 9(A)(5), such forfeiture does not affect an appellate court’s jurisdiction, In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014); see also App. R. 1 (permitting “deviation” from our appellate rules). So we have carved out a narrow exception to reinstate a forfeited appeal if the appellant shows “that there are ‘extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be restored.’” Cooper’s Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray, 162 N.E.3d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 2021) (quoting O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 971). At the same time, “it is never error for an appellate court to dismiss an untimely appeal.” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 579 (Ind. 2017).
Applying these principles here, we first consider whether the State had statutory authority to appeal the trial court’s order denying approval of the delinquency petition. Ultimately, however, we find it unnecessary to resolve that issue. The order was a final judgment, and the State forfeited its right to appeal by failing to file its notice of appeal within thirty days after the court denied the State’s motion to correct error. And because the State has failed to present any extraordinarily compelling reasons for reinstating that right, we dismiss this appeal.
As explained above, the State may appeal the order denying approval of its delinquency petition only if Section 35-38-4-2 authorizes the appeal. In the Court of Appeals, the State pursued only a discretionary interlocutory appeal authorized by Subsection (b). On transfer, however, the State characterizes the trial court’s order as analogous to “an order granting a motion to dismiss one (1) or more counts of an indictment or information,” which is appealable under Subsection (a)(1). B.H., however, has consistently argued the State lacks any statutory authority to appeal this order.
We begin with the State’s original contention that it appealed an “interlocutory order” under Section 35-38-4-2(b). At oral argument, the State suggested it is an “open question” whether an order denying approval to file a delinquency petition is final or interlocutory. We disagree…Here, the trial court’s rejection of the State’s delinquency petition, though subject to challenge through a motion to correct error, left nothing more to decide and was therefore final. Accordingly, the State lacked statutory authority to appeal that order under Subsection (b).
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Based on the differences identified above, we concluded that “a juvenile court’s discretionary decision to disapprove a delinquency petition” did not fit within that provision. Id. But here, unlike in I.T., the trial court’s grounds for denying approval were jurisdictional, not discretionary. And lack of jurisdiction is grounds for dismissing an indictment or information. I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(10). So the juvenile–criminal analogy is closer here than it was in I.T. Still, it is unclear whether this order falls within Subsection (a)(1). Indeed, the court’s order did not grant a motion to dismiss but denied the State’s request to approve its petition. And the order did not necessarily “dismiss” the petition, since the petition was never approved for filing. See Ind. Trial Rule 3 (stating the “filing” of a complaint or equivalent pleading is necessary to commence an action). Thus, even assuming the Legislature intended us to seek a “criminal analog” for a juvenile delinquency order, Subsection (a)(1) does not appear to describe the order before us.
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Ultimately, we are left uncertain whether the Legislature intended Section 35-38-4-2 to apply to a trial court’s order disapproving the State’s delinquency petition on jurisdictional grounds. But we need not resolve that issue today because, even if the statute authorized the State’s appeal, the State forfeited that right.
As explained above, the trial court’s order rejecting the State’s delinquency petition was a final judgment. And because the State timely moved to correct error, it had thirty days after the court denied that motion to file a notice of appeal. App. R. 9(A)(1). The State missed this deadline and thus forfeited its right to appeal. App. R. 9(5). But we have the discretion to reinstate this forfeited right if the State shows “extraordinarily compelling reasons” for doing so. Cooper’s Hawk Indianapolis, LLC, 162 N.E.3d at 1098 (quoting O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 971). The State, however, has not made that showing.
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Here, unlike in O.R. or D.J., the State’s appeal does not involve a fundamental liberty interest. And unlike the parents in those cases, the State is a sophisticated litigant with ample resources at its disposal to ensure compliance with our appellate rules. To be sure, we are concerned about the trial court’s error. But if that error is repeated, the State can either seek to correct it in a timely appeal or file a petition for a writ of mandamus. Ultimately, because the State has failed to present any extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore its right to appeal, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.
For the reasons explained above, we dismiss the State’s appeal.
Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.